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ORIGINAL(ISM) SIN
G. ALEX SINHA†
INTRODUCTION
During President Trump’s term in office, the Senate
confirmed nearly 250 of his federal judicial nominees, including 3
to the Supreme Court of the United States.1 That number
amounts to nearly a third of the federal judiciary’s roughly 800
active members.2 By and large, the judges nominated by President
Trump purport to apply some form of originalist constitutional
interpretation or construction,3 though the subject of originalism
featured perhaps most prominently at the confirmation hearings
for Amy Coney Barrett, whom President Trump nominated in
†
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1
Harper Neidig, Senate Confirms Two More Trump Judicial Nominees, HILL
(Dec. 16, 2020, 5:06 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/530557-senateconfirms-two-more-trump-judicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/D7GT-98HY]. The
Senate confirmed another 54 of President Trump’s nominees to seats on appellate
courts. Id.
2
See John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in
RSCH.
CTR.
(Jan.
13,
2021),
Appointing
Federal
Judges,
PEW
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-otherrecent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/
[https://perma.cc/BC7Y-RPFL]
(tallying 816 active federal judges across district courts, appellate courts, and the
Supreme Court in January of 2021).
3
See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Reshaping American Jurisprudence in the Trump Era –
The Rise of “Originalist” Judges, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 341, 358–59 (2019) (reflecting on
President Trump’s judicial appointments midway through his term and noting that
he “will surely continue to rack up more originalist jurists”); id. at 360 (observing that
a “ ‘Trump judge’ will generally fall into the category of the originalist”); see also John
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Trump’s Judges Will Bring America Together,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2020, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-judgeswill-bring-america-together-11600988950 [https://perma.cc/PF55-873Z] (observing,
days after the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that “Mr. Trump will surely
nominate the same kind of judges he has before—jurists who believe in following the
original meaning of the Constitution” and that “Mr. Trump’s judges are self-conscious
originalists and textualists”).
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October of 2020 to replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.4
Whatever one thinks of the vast literature on the variants, merits,
and demerits of originalism,5 the Trump Presidency has ensured
its long-term relevance—if not its ascendancy—in federal court.
The general thrust of originalism is that judges should
interpret the U.S. Constitution—or construct its meaning, where
necessary6—as if it possesses some sort of fixed meaning, a
meaning typically anchored in the intentions or beliefs of those
who drafted or ratified it, or in the original public meaning of the
words and phrases it comprises.7 It is no accident that a
Republican President and Senate jointly prioritized the
confirmation of originalist judges; there is a strong correlation
between purportedly originalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation and conservative policy preferences more

4
See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Barrett, an Originalist, Says Meaning of Constitution
NPR
(Oct.
13,
2020,
10:08
AM),
‘Doesn’t
Change
Over
Time,’
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtconfirmation/2020/10/13/923215778/barrett-an-originalist-says-meaning-ofconstitution-doesn-t-change-over-time [https://perma.cc/J5L9-FEVM] (reproducing
one relevant exchange between Barrett and a senator during the hearings); Jonathan
Allen et al., Highlights of Amy Coney Barrett’s Questioning at Supreme Court
NEWS
(Oct.
13,
2020,
8:31
PM),
Confirmation
Hearing,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/live-blog/live-updates-amy-coneybarrett-faces-questions-supreme-court-confirmation-n1243016/
ncrd1243178#blogHeader [https://perma.cc/PT29-XYP9] (reproducing another
relevant moment from Barrett’s confirmation).
5
It is impossible to identify the literature comprehensively here. For some key
contributions to the debate, however, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 143–85 (1990); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1–5 (2004); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–64 (1989); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 86 (2009).
6
Some commentators distinguish between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional construction. See BARNETT, supra note 5, at 123 (favorably quoting
Keith Whittington’s definition of the terms). That distinction is not especially
important for present purposes, and, notably, it rarely carries over to “judicial
opinions or public discourse.” Greene, supra note 5, at 10.
7
Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the Common
Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1660 (2013) (crediting Lawrence Solum with the view that
the unifying feature of the disparate strands of originalism is that all strands
“maintain . . . a fixed-in-time constitutional meaning that constrains modern
interpretation”). Some commentators refer to the proposition that the Constitution
carries a fixed meaning as the “[f]ixation [t]hesis.” Christina Mulligan, Diverse
Originalism, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 379, 381 n.6 (2018). My abbreviated description of
originalism here obscures a great deal, of course. See infra Part I.A, for a more refined
explanation of how I use the term.
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generally.8 Indeed, some scholars have argued that originalism,
as the term is presently understood, derives at least in part from
a political strategy adopted by the Reagan administration to
advance particular policy preferences through the courts.9
But one criticism of President Trump’s nominees—that they
8

See Tsesis, supra note 7, at 1661 (“The ideology most originalists espouse is too
closely related to the conservative political agenda to ignore the overlap between it
and party partisanship.”). Others have made similar observations:
The originalism movement is connected to a set of political commitments. We
need not guess at what those commitments are. The Reagan Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Policy produced a document in 1988 entitled
The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional
Interpretation. The document proclaimed itself designed to identify the
stakes of the “judicial philosophies” of the judges appointed to the Supreme
Court. The claimed results dictated by an originalist view of the Constitution
aligned nicely with the Republican political program of the 1980s:
restrictions on abortion rights, gay rights, immigrant rights, and affirmative
action, and protections for private discrimination, school prayer, state
autonomy, and property rights. . . . Originalism does not obviously produce
some of those positions—restrictions on affirmative action, for example—but
originalism was a means of casting many of them in putatively neutral terms
and therefore branding the agenda as a whole as consistent with
constitutional fidelity.
Greene, supra note 5, at 86 (footnotes omitted); see also Tom McCarthy, Amy Coney
Barrett Is a Constitutional ‘Originalist’ – But What Does It Mean?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26,
2020, 8:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/26/amy-coneybarrett-originalist-but-what-does-it-mean [https://perma.cc/2SY2-3NAX] (quoting
Aziz Huq as stating, “ ‘The political discourse of originalism is closely aligned with the
policy preferences of the Republican party that has promoted judges who happen to
take this perspective. It purports to be something that is moving outside politics, but
it is . . . tightly linked to a particular partisan political orientation.’ ”). By the same
token, Democratic Presidents would tend to nominate judges who adhere to some form
of “living constitutionalis[m],” which in practice is more conducive to their preferred
policy outcomes. See Addicott, supra note 3, at 346 (describing originalists as
“conservative” and living constitutionalists as “liberal”). But see Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 549
(2009) (arguing that “[o]riginal meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are
compatible positions. In fact, they are two sides of the same coin. Although not all
versions of these theories are compatible, the most intellectually sound versions of
each theory are.”); Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2, 3
(2020) (arguing that, under certain assumptions, “the ‘original’ Constitution is a
flexible and pragmatic charter, not a fixed and immutable artifact”).
9
See Greene, supra note 5, at 17 (arguing that “the originalism of today is the
product of a political mobilization. It is . . . a movement that preceded the nominations
of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and was deliberately designed to produce their
jurisprudential approaches.”). As a result, a substantial swath of the lay public
recognizes the term (or its general thrust). See id. (noting that originalism “is
discussed on talk radio and in bestselling books; in blogs and in newspaper columns;
in presidential campaigns and at water coolers”). But see Mulligan, supra note 7, at
390 (“However, despite its prominence in the Reagan administration, most originalists
would be offended at the insinuation that their goals were to manipulate legal and
popular discourse in order to unprincipledly advance a conservative policy agenda.”).

742

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:739

are overwhelmingly white and male10—mirrors a criticism of
originalism itself: that prioritizing the original understanding of
the Constitution, to the extent such a thing is discernible,11 is to
elevate the white, male, propertied voices of the Framers to the
exclusion of essentially all others.12 In doing so, originalism
threatens to reify the significant racial, gender, class and
intellectual prejudices of the Framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution.13 This point appears in various forms within the
sweeping critiques of liberal legal ideology offered by certain
feminist and critical race scholars,14 and it has been translated
10
See McCarthy, supra note 8 (reporting that “[e]lected officials and others who
have noticed that 86% of Trump’s judicial appointees are white and 75% are men have
begun to hear something else in the term [‘originalism’]: a nostalgic appeal to the
exclusive hold on power by white men at the time the [C]onstitution was written”).
11
See Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of New Originalism, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (2013) (arguing that historical sources may indicate
different possible original meanings, and, therefore, pushing courts to consider
original intentions); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition:
Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2006 (2012) (noting that
“nonoriginalists [have] argued that it [is] either impossible in principle to ascertain
the original intent of a multi-member body . . . or [so] practically difficult . . . that the
endeavor would regularly fail”).
12
See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 583 (1990) (“Despite its claims, however, this voice [of ‘We the
People’] does not speak for everyone, but for a political faction trying to constitute
itself as a unit of many disparate voices; its power lasts only as long as the
contradictory voices remain silenced. . . . [T]he ‘we’ of ‘We the People[ ]’ . . . depend[s]
on the silence of others” and “has silenced them.”); see also Mulligan, supra note 7, at
380 (footnotes omitted) (“At the 2017 Originalism Works-in-Progress conference, nonoriginalist scholar Richard Primus tweeted before the first panel, ‘At a conference on
originalism. Nice people here. I count 31 around the table. 29 men; 28 white men.’ ”);
id. at 402 (“Originalist interpretation tends to be done by self-identified originalists—
a group that tends to be highly educated, affluent, white, male, and tends to hold
conservative, libertarian, or Republican views.”).
13
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
613 (1999) (considering the view that a “generation that countenanced slave-holders
has not the moral legitimacy to rule us from the grave or from anywhere else. Because
their intentions were racist, sexist, and classist, far from being bound by them, we
ought loudly to denounce and reject them. According to this view, not only was the
Constitution not a product of the consent, it was a product of original sin.”). For a more
extended articulation of this objection, see Michael S. Lewis, Evil History: Protecting
Our Constitution Through an Anti-Originalism Canon of Constitutional
Interpretation, 18 U.N.H. L. REV. 261, 290–301 (2020).
14
See generally, e.g., Harris, supra note 12 (noting the exclusion of women from
the Framing, but arguing that the diverse experiences and viewpoints of women
complicate the task of unpacking the implications of their exclusion); see also Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543, 581–82 (1986) (observing that “[b]ecause women have been excluded from
the mainstream of legal authority and legal change, the legal system, like moral,
political, and philosophical discourse, has become ‘a set of cultural and symbolic forms
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into a variety of forms by constitutional scholars as well.15
Although it increasingly invites originalist responses,16 the
problem of constitutional exclusion does not seem to engage
directly with the premises often used to justify originalism,17 and
therefore the problem gets treated at times more as a symbolic or
abstract concern, a source of rhetorical flourish rather than a
theoretical threat.18 Indeed, constitutional law scholars often
focus on other critiques of originalism, such as the practical
difficulty of discerning an original understanding of the
Constitution, or the democratic barriers to enacting constitutional
amendments.19 Those constitutional theorists who contend with
that view human experience from the distorted and one-sided perspective of a single
gender,’ ” ensuring that “our legal structure . . . reflects a distorted view of the tension
between autonomy and connection and between the individual and society.”).
15
See generally Mulligan, supra note 7, at 382–83, 398 (breaking down the
possible concerns about constitutional exclusion into several categories, including
different forms of concern about adverse consequences, a problem of dead-hand
control, a challenge to the Constitution’s representational legitimacy, a more
amorphous worry about a “[c]ontamination” of the Constitution, and a recognition that
exclusion alienates present-day disadvantaged groups from the Constitution).
16
See generally, e.g., Barnett, supra note 13; Mulligan, supra note 7; James W.
Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. REV.
675, 679 (2016). For a list of further sources that give the matter “important, but brief
treatment,” see Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 397,
399 n.11 (2010).
17
See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power To Enact ColorConscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 483 (1998) (offering a
“conventional and widely shared version” of an argument for originalism: “(1) the
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, is a species of written law; (2) the
meaning of a written law depends upon a consideration of the text read in light of the
intent of the lawmaker; (3) the ratifiers of any constitutional provision are the
lawmaker, i.e., the people who authoritatively establish it as the supreme law of the
land; and (4) judges, especially in cases involving written law, are authorized only to
apply principles or rules authoritatively established by others, i.e., the authorized
lawmakers”). On Siegel’s model argument, the exclusivity of the voices relevant to
determining the original understanding of the Constitution is not obviously relevant.
18
See Stein, supra note 16, at 407 (quoting Michael McConnell’s view that “the
oft-heard complaint that the Constitution has no legitimate claim of authority to bind
us because blacks and women were excluded from the franchise in 1787, seems beside
the point. No one now alive was represented in 1787.”). Stein properly points out the
defect in this understanding of the objection. Id.; see also Mulligan, supra note 7, at
393–95 (quoting Randy Barnett’s articulation of a concern about prejudices among the
Framers in which he declines to cite any sources that have raised that point as an
objection). Barnett ultimately dismisses the objection as well. See Barnett, supra note
13, at 652. In fact, elsewhere he claims that “both constitutional legitimacy and the
commitment to a written constitution necessitate reliance upon the original meaning
of the text.” BARNETT, supra note 5, at 120.
19
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 665 (2009) (“The two
most effective theoretical deficiencies of originalism relate in varying degrees to the
difficulty that time poses for historicist constitutional methodologies.”); id. at 666

744

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:739

constitutional exclusion20—or the related issues of the Framers’
biases—generally understand it as a criticism of the purportedly
democratic underpinnings of the Constitution, and therefore as a
challenge to the document’s political legitimacy.21 Some have also
understood it to suggest that the Constitution is tainted—and thus
illegitimate—or that its history alienates disadvantaged groups.22
This Article articulates a novel, powerful, and broad form of
the objection from constitutional exclusion that is neither
contingent for its force on the exclusion of any specific group23 nor
focused per se on the political legitimacy of the Constitution. The
Article thus demonstrates that the objection is not merely
symbolic, rhetorical, or hypothetical. The form of the objection
articulated below also persists despite subsequent amendments to
the
Constitution
approved
under
less
exclusionary
circumstances.24
Fundamentally, constitutional exclusion
(“[First, i]t is difficult enough for a judge to divine the original ratifying generation’s
collective understanding of an ambiguous constitutional provision. The Constitution
was a negotiated compromise. Those who drafted the document are not the same as
those who ratified it, those who ratified it are not the same as the population at large,
and the various agendas and understandings of its provisions were wide-ranging and
at times contradictory.”); id. at 668 (“A second and perhaps more significant objection
to the form of originalism I have described derives from its implication that the
Constitution itself, through Article V, prescribes the sole method of peaceful
amendment. This is quite unlike most ordinary contracts, which customarily may be
amended by consent of the parties, and indeed distinguishes the Constitution from
most statutes, wills, judicial opinions, and other documents to which constitutions
have been too casually compared.”). Indeed, scholars engaging with, or itemizing
criticisms of originalism often focus elsewhere. See Strang, supra note 11, at 2006–07
(summarizing four key objections to early originalism that led to its revision, but
omitting constitutional exclusion from that list).
20
Other scholars use slightly different names for the problem. Mark Stein uses
the term “original exclusions.” Stein, supra note 16, at 410. James Fox Jr. refers more
generally to “the exclusionary critique.” Fox, supra note 16, at 679. I use these terms
interchangeably throughout.
21
Stein, supra note 16, at 410 (arguing that “we can . . . deny that the purported
work of the People has the moral legitimacy to bind subsequent generations, merely
from the processes that produced it, if it is not the work of the People at all, but only
the product of a small privileged minority”); see also Mulligan, supra note 7, at 396
(identifying this version of the objection).
22
See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 398–400.
23
The form of the objection offered here therefore contrasts with the version one
may find in feminist jurisprudence, for example. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 582
(suggesting that the exclusion of women in particular—not just from the framing of
the Constitution, but from the legal system more generally—produces “a distorted
view of the tension between autonomy and connection and between the individual and
society”).
24
Cf. Stein, supra note 16, at 408 (footnote omitted) (“[D]efects of the antebellum
Constitution have been remedied (by the Civil War, various constitutional
amendments, state-law expansion of the franchise, and Supreme Court decisions), so
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implicates persistent inequality. In a salient and unavoidable
sense, the Constitution enacts a principle of moral and substantive
inequality for different groups of the American populace—the very
groups that remain systemically disadvantaged today.
The equality of persons is a fundamental and uncontroversial
moral principle.25 But equality confers special force on the
problem of constitutional exclusion when paired with one further
assumption: that the law should positively influence our moral
development. As I argue below, that assumption is particularly
plausible in the context of the Constitution. It is also surprisingly
common, albeit under-recognized as such, and I argue that its wide
acceptance helps explain the persistence of the objection from
constitutional exclusion.
Notably, the notion that the law should guide us toward the
proper moral orientation is central to a theoretical framework
known as virtue jurisprudence.26 Virtue jurisprudence analyzes
the law in terms of its relationship to the individual virtues of its
subjects.27 Many adherents of virtue jurisprudence believe the law
should function to facilitate the virtue-centered flourishing of its
subjects, channeling arguments for that conclusion through
Aristotle and Aquinas.28 Virtue jurisprudence is growing rapidly
in popularity, especially within conservative circles most likely to
endorse originalism.29 It should not be surprising, therefore, that

they do not suggest that the current Constitution is morally illegitimate.”). Note,
however, that Stein regards this constitutional remediation to be evidence that the
“original ratification cannot alone provide moral legitimacy.” Id.
25
See infra Part III.A.
26
Timothy Cantu, Note, Virtue Jurisprudence and the American Constitution, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2013).
27
Id. at 1527–28.
28
Id. at 1524–25.
29
See G. Alex Sinha, Virtuous Law-Breaking, 13 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 199, 207–
09 (2021); see also, e.g., Strang, supra note 11, at 2000 (arguing that the virtues and
originalism go hand-in-hand); Lawrence B. Solum, Op-Ed: Judge Barrett Is an
Originalist. Should We Be Afraid?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:31 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-10-14/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtoriginalism-conservative (offering Solum’s view that “[t]he core of originalism is the
rule of law. And that is not something we should fear.”); Colin Farrelly & Lawrence
B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 1,
1–3 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (expressing Solum’s support for
strong virtue jurisprudence); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 1–2 (1993) (presenting George’s argument in favor
of “morals legislation” because it would promote the virtues of members of society);
Robert P. George, Antonin Scalia: An American Originalist, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 16,
2016), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16478/ [https://perma.cc/P8X2-
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scholars have already begun to offer virtue-based arguments for
originalism.30
This Article confronts and rejects those arguments, ultimately
contending that constitutional exclusion, as a manifestation of
inequality, affirmatively undermines the virtue-centered
flourishing of the populace. Thus, those who feel the force of the
objection from constitutional exclusion may possess an unnoticed
affinity for virtue jurisprudence, and those drawn to virtue
jurisprudence may struggle to reconcile those inclinations with
originalism.
Part I of the Article explains the terms “originalism” and
“virtue jurisprudence” as I use them here. Part II presents and
rebuts the three virtue-based arguments for originalism that have
been offered to date. Finally, Part III explores the normative
implications of exclusion-as-inequality, arguing that it kneecaps
our constitutional system as a source of virtue-centered
flourishing—especially if we adopt originalism.
I. SETTING THE TABLE
A.

Originalism

The abundant literature on originalism reflects its
prominence as an interpretive methodology,31 and I do not
reproduce that literature here. Although I endeavor to use the
term “originalism” in an uncontroversial sense, defining it
properly takes care. For one, self-identified originalists are hardly
monolithic.32
Moreover, some scholars contend that “all
constitutional interpretation is originalist” in the sense that
maintaining even minimal fidelity to any constitution requires
carving out some role for its original meaning.33
Let us begin by rejecting the latter point, or at least
minimizing it. The term “originalist” clearly connotes a specific
approach to adjudicating constitutional questions—an approach
99LV] (eulogizing Justice Scalia upon his death and speaking favorably of his
originalist approach to adjudication).
30
See infra Part II.
31
See supra note 5 (offering some prominent sources on originalism). This Part
cites many more sources throughout.
32
See Siegel, supra note 17, at 482 (observing that “it is difficult to describe
originalism in a manner that satisfies all who claim its aegis, which is one reason
originalists justly complain that their critics frequently tilt at a caricature of their
jurisprudence”).
33
Greene, supra note 5, at 8.
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with certain expected results.34 When federal judicial nominees
identify as originalist at their confirmation hearings, they do not
mean to adopt—and their audiences do not hear—an empty
descriptor that applies equally to everyone. Most generally, judges
who adopt the label imply, roughly, that they will “apply the
Constitution according to the principles intended by those who
ratified the document,” even if they diverge on the sources that
inform such an exercise.35 I nevertheless accept the possibility that
the distinction between some originalists and some nonoriginalists
is not a difference in kind but rather a difference in their degree of
deference to a fixed-in-time meaning.36 That proposition has
implications I address below.37
Commentators routinely distinguish between early strands of
originalism that prioritized the intentions of the Framers or
ratifiers, and newer strands that prioritize the original public
meaning of the words and phrases that constitute the
Constitution.38 According to “original intent” originalism, judges
adjudicating constitutional questions should attribute meaning to
relevant constitutional provisions in accordance with their
understanding of what the “provision’s framers intended [them] to
mean.”39 Scholars often attribute a version of this view to early
originalists, such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork.40
Various criticisms of this view spurred an evolution toward
“original meaning” originalism,41 which prioritizes “the
34
See Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of
History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459, 477–78 (1997).
35
Siegel, supra note 17, at 482–83.
36
See Stein, supra note 16, at 399 (“Nonoriginalism is a matter of occasion and a
matter of degree. . . . Nonoriginalists need not deny . . . that courts should be
constrained, to some extent, by the language and original meaning of the
Constitution.”).
37
See infra Part III.
38
See Strang, supra note 11, at 2007 (noting that “originalists moved away from
original intent by adopting an original meaning focus for originalism”); Greene, supra
note 5, at 9 (“There has been a gradual but dramatic shift in preference among
academic originalists in favor of original meaning rather than original intent.”).
Others divide up originalism somewhat differently. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 16, at
400 (footnotes omitted) (arguing that “[s]ome [originalists] would enforce the original
intent of the [F]ramers, others the original understanding of the ratifiers, and still
others—now probably the dominant group—the original ‘public meaning.’ ”).
39
Strang, supra note 11, at 2005.
40
See, e.g., id. at 2003–04 (briefly describing the views of Berger and Bork).
41
See id. at 2006–07 (footnotes omitted) (listing four key criticisms that motivated
the reformulation of originalism, which included shifting the focus from original intent
to original meaning. These objections include “that it was either impossible in
principle to ascertain the original intent of a multi-member body, such as the
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conventional meaning of the Constitution’s text at the time of
adoption.”42 This shift—from original intent to original meaning—
reinforces a strong connection between originalism and
textualism; for many, originalism is a form of textualism,
according to which the primary source for resolving constitutional
questions falls on the constitutional text.43
Although “original meaning” originalism appears to be more
popular presently, both views have their defenders.44 I follow
Jamal Greene in using the term “original understanding” to
encompass both “original intent” and “original meaning.”45
According to Greene, originalism, in either form, “privilege[s] the
original understanding of the document as against organic
alterations to that understanding brought about through social
change and judicial innovation[, and] consider[s] the original
understanding dispositive or at least presumptively correct in
matters of first impression.”46 Similarly, Lawrence Solum claims
that, properly understood, academic debates about “originalism”
address those “constitutional theories that affirm both the
Fixation Thesis (the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed at
the time each provision is drafted) and the Constraint Principle
(constitutional practice should, at a minimum, be consistent with
the original meaning . . . ).”47
By contrast, nonoriginalist approaches might accept original
understanding as relevant but not dispositive, giving greater
weight than originalist approaches do to other factors, such as
“precedent, unwritten implications from constitutional structure,

Philadelphia Convention or state ratification conventions; or, if possible, it was
practically difficult such that the endeavor would regularly fail”; that “even when one
could reliably ascertain the Constitution’s original intent, it frequently ‘ran
out[ ]’ . . . [leaving] judges adrift”; that originalism, as formulated, evinced “[a]
commitment to overrule all or almost all nonoriginalist precedent . . . [and] was
[therefore] deeply inconsistent with existing legal practice”; and “that originalism was
unacceptable because of the bad consequences to which its adoption would lead.”).
42
Id. at 2007–08.
43
See Siegel, supra note 17, at 485–86 (explaining the correlation between
originalism and textualism, but noting some exceptions).
44
Strang, supra note 11, at 2010–11.
45
Greene, supra note 5, at 9.
46
Id.
47
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2019). Solum
adds one further necessary feature of originalist theories, beyond acceptance of the
Fixation Thesis and Constraint Principle: such theories must also offer a “reasonable
account of original meaning and of the extent of constitutional underdeterminacy.” Id.
at 1246 (footnote omitted).
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contemporary public understanding, and political consequences.”48
One prominent version of nonoriginalism is “living
constitutionalism,” which more specifically accepts that
“constitutional practice can and should change in response to
changing circumstances and values.”49
I address the substantive implications of originalism below,50
but it should be apparent at this stage why originalism implicates
the objection from constitutional exclusion: prioritizing some sort
of original understanding of constitutional provisions both
symbolically embraces whatever unknown textual implications
follow from the exclusion of diverse voices at the Framing, and
unavoidably incorporates whatever prejudices are embedded in
that understanding into modern-day constitutional jurisprudence.
It is also worth noting that most of the arguments advanced by
proponents of originalism51—and most of the objections offered by
critics52—are beyond the scope of this Article. But I explore the
relationship between the objection from constitutional exclusion
and certain purported advantages of originalism after explaining
exclusion-as-inequality.53
B.

Virtue Jurisprudence

Although contemporary virtue jurisprudence is only a couple
decades old, literature adopting its methodology has proliferated
rapidly in that short time.54 Scholars have applied virtue-based
analysis to myriad substantive areas of the law, including
contracts, criminal law, property law, bankruptcy law, and many
others.55 Some have also used the virtues to analyze the
professional duties of judges and attorneys.56 Fundamentally,
48

Greene, supra note 5, at 9.
Solum, supra note 47, at 1246.
50
See infra Parts II.A, III.A.3.
51
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 17, at 483 (noting that originalists often purport to
derive support for their views based on “the concern for constitutional law’s
legitimacy, stability and certainty; the role of the judiciary in a democratic state; the
warrant for judicial review; and the conception of law”).
52
See supra note 19 (citing Strang’s list of four major objections to early
formulations of originalism); see also Greene, supra note 19, at 670 (arguing that
originalism struggles with indeterminacy and “fails to resolve the
countermajoritarian difficulty”).
53
See infra Part III.
54
For a more detailed history of the arc of virtue jurisprudence, see Sinha, supra
note 29, at 212–18.
55
See id. at 207–09 (providing numerous citations to these—and other—
applications of the methodology).
56
See id. at 207 (offering relevant citations).
49
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virtue jurisprudence derives from theoretical developments in
analytic moral philosophy in the 1950s, when scholars began to
revive virtue-based analysis, or “virtue ethics,”—an approach
often attributed to certain ancient philosophers like Aristotle.57 At
the most general level, for virtue ethicists, the task of moral
deliberation amounts to an inquiry into what a virtuous person
would do.58 This conception of moral deliberation contrasts, at
least traditionally, with consequentialist or utilitarian inquiries
into which course of action would promote optimal consequences,
as well as with deontological inquiries into which course of action
an agent is duty-bound to pursue.59
For most scholars working in the area, the virtues are
relatively stable character traits—such as honesty, fortitude, or
wisdom—that predict and explain how agents will respond under
different circumstances.60 These traits may be difficult to acquire;
for instance, they might require social conditioning and moral
education.61 The list of virtues can vary,62 but a common view
holds that to possess them in abundance is to function well as a
human, to warrant praise, and perhaps to succeed at the highest
end one can pursue.63 Some theorists maintain that the virtues
are interdependent in a strong sense—that to possess one of the
virtues is to possess them all in some reasonable measure.64

57
See Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai, Of Law, Virtue and Justice—An
Introduction, in LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE 1, 1 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds.,
2013) (“Virtue ethics re-emerged in the late 1950s, with Elizabeth Anscombe’s
important article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy.’ ”); Farrelly & Solum, supra note 29, at
3–4 (also treating Anscombe’s paper as the main influence behind the contemporary
shift toward virtue-based moral philosophy). Some scholars refer to this shift as the
“aretaic turn.” See Sinha, supra note 29, at 205–06 (describing the aretaic turn in
moral philosophy, and the parallel, subsequent turn in legal theory). For a modern
exploration of virtue ethics derived from Aristotelian ethics, see generally ROSALIND
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999).
58
See Nafsika Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics, INTERNET ENCYC. PHILA.,
https://iep.utm.edu/virtue/ [https://perma.cc/P8EZ-4QAV] (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
59
HURSTHOUSE, supra note 57, at 1–2.
60
See id. at 11 (describing honesty as a virtuous character trait).
61
See id. at 113–19 (providing an example of the process of inculcating virtue by
training one’s emotional responses).
62
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 213 (comparing Plato’s short list of cardinal virtues
with Aristotle’s longer taxonomy of virtues).
63
HURSTHOUSE, supra note 57, at 20–21; Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, STAN.
ENCYC. PHIL. (June 15, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotleethics/#InteVirt [https://perma.cc/7SGY-PGRS].
64
See John Finnis, Aquinas’ Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 16, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinasmoral-political/#VirtAlsoSourRathThanConcMoraJudg [https://perma.cc/893U-5LP9]
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Whether or not the virtues are interconnected, they suggest a
textured account of moral deliberation that may include balancing
of the competing demands of various virtues even in
relatively quotidian situations.65
A common understanding of virtue ethics incorporates a
distinctly human form of thriving, expressed by the ancient Greek
word “eudaimonia.”66 It is typical to translate “eudaimonia” to
“happiness,” “flourishing,” or even “well-being,” but those English
I use
words gesture only imperfectly at “eudaimonia.”67
“flourishing,” its limitations notwithstanding, but on no
conception of the virtues would vacuous happiness alone—
however enduring—constitute human flourishing.
More
traditionally, possession of the virtues is essential to human
flourishing.68 To flourish in this sense is to manifest the virtues in
proper balance, and to live a good and happy life accordingly.69
This feature of virtue ethics—the link it posits between virtue and
flourishing—helps to distinguish it from run-of-the-mill
utilitarianism or deontology.
There are two major forms of virtue jurisprudence, which we
might label “strong” and “weak.”70 Strong virtue jurisprudence
centers the notion of virtue-centered human flourishing, adopting
that end as the lodestar for the legal regulation of human
conduct.71 Rather than promoting a broad conception of social
welfare, or equality, or even rights, theorists adopting strong
virtue jurisprudence believe the law should function to facilitate
its subjects’ acquisition and manifestation of the virtues.72 By
contrast, weak virtue jurisprudence deploys the virtues for some
limited heuristic purpose in contemplating questions about the
law, but it does not necessarily accept—or may even affirmatively
reject—the notion that the law should conduce to virtue-based
(attributing this view to Aquinas, who derived it from Platonic and Aristotelian
ethics).
65
See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 57, at 12–13 (articulating some of these
complexities through the example of the virtue of generosity).
66
Id. at 20.
67
Id. at 9–10.
68
Id. at 20.
69
Id.
70
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 215–16 (making and defining this distinction).
71
Id. at 215.
72
Farrelly & Solum, supra note 29, at 2 (“For virtue jurisprudence, the final end
of the law is not to maximize preference satisfaction or to protect some set of rights
and privileges: the final end of law is to promote human flourishing—to enable
humans to lead excellent lives.”).
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flourishing.73
In this Article, I focus on strong virtue
jurisprudence, and I often use the term “virtue jurisprudence” to
refer specifically to its strong variant. Although weak virtue
jurisprudence is receptive to certain insights from virtue theory, it
generates too few theoretical commitments to be much use in
informing the selection of a preferred mode of constitutional
interpretation.74
II. VIRTUE-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR ORIGINALISM
Although some have advocated for injecting virtue analysis
into constitutional theory,75 originalism and virtue jurisprudence
do not obviously address the same questions.76 Competing modes
of constitutional interpretation could conceivably shape the
excellence or flourishing of the public in a variety of ways,
although the most prominent arguments in favor of originalism do
not overtly draw on the propensity for an original understanding
of the Constitution to facilitate virtue-centered flourishing among
the populace.77 Nevertheless, given their shared popularity in
conservative circles, it was only a matter of time before scholars
would begin to link the two. This Part considers the arguments
that scholars have offered to date to justify originalism by
appealing to the virtues.

73

See, e.g., Amaya & Lai, supra note 57, at 5 (footnote omitted) (“Just as it is
possible for a philosopher to give an account of virtue without being a virtue ethicist,
it is possible for a lawyer to offer a study of virtue in the legal context without rooting
it in virtue ethics.”).
74
An originalist scholar with weak virtue jurisprudential commitments and a
living constitutionalist with weak virtue jurisprudential commitments will likely
argue past each other on the level of virtue.
75
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2004) (arguing that “constitutional theory should make an
aretaic turn—analogous to the turn to virtue ethics in moral theory”).
76
See Strang, supra note 11, at 2027 (“Virtue ethics addresses human character
and acts, while the fixation and contribution theses address the criteria for the truth
of claims regarding constitutional meaning (within originalism).”). At the same time,
according to Strang, there is nothing “preclud[ing originalism] from incorporating
virtue ethics’ insights.” Id. at 2026.
77
See supra note 51. Scholars have offered other moral arguments in favor of
originalism, however—arguments not based explicitly on the virtues. See, e.g., J. Joel
Alicea, The Moral Authority of Original Meaning, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (arguing that the original meaning of the Constitution has
independent moral weight because it is essential to sustaining the legitimate
authority of the populace and, in turn, the pursuit of the common good).
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The Substantive Outcomes Promoted by Originalism

Lee Strang has argued that originalism brings about “the best
set of conditions for human flourishing for Americans today,”78 or,
at minimum, that “regardless of one’s conception of the Good,
originalism is more likely to produce the conditions necessary for
Americans to flourish than the alternative, judicial updating.”79
Although Strang does not specifically define “judicial updating,”
he appears to mean some generic form of nonoriginalism that
permits judges to read contemporary norms into the
Constitution—norms that were arguably absent originally.80
Strang explicitly adopts strong virtue jurisprudence in
making this argument, asserting that “[l]aw is one of the key
mechanisms that humans utilize to achieve human flourishing.”81
He also defines “flourishing” in a manner consistent with the
traditional virtue ethical backstory: “Human flourishing is when a
human possesses deep, abiding happiness [through participation]
in the basic human goods, such as life, knowledge, and
friendship.”82 He is careful to add that “[v]irtue is both constitutive
of human flourishing and a mechanism to pursue flourishing” and
that
“the
good
life
includes
virtuous
activity.”83
But Strang’s argument linking this ethical view to originalism
omits essential details. According to Strang:
[T]he Constitution’s original meaning provides the conditions for
human flourishing because it preserves a robust sphere for
ordered individual freedom vis-á-vis the federal government, and
it does so in multiple ways. First, the Constitution’s original
meaning protects natural rights. Second, the Constitution’s
original meaning preserves individual freedom via limits on
federal power through the constitutional principles of limited and

78
Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Promise, and Its Limits, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81,
87 (2014).
79
Id. at 90.
80
Id. Elsewhere in his article, Strang refers to “judicial updating via
nonoriginalist precedent,” citing work by John O. McGinnis and Michael B.
Rappaport. Id. at 94. In their book, McGinnis and Rappaport attempt to assess
“whether it would be superior to follow the original meaning of the Constitution or to
allow judges to depart from the Constitution in an effort to update it or establish new
constitutional norms.” JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM
AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 85 (2013). McGinnis and Rappaport appear to equate
that view, reasonably enough, with “[t]he living constitution approach to
interpretation.” Id. at 87.
81
Strang, supra note 78, at 88.
82
Id. at 87–88 (footnotes omitted).
83
Id. at 88.
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enumerated powers, separation of powers, check and balances,
and federalism. Third, the Constitution’s original meaning
creates a wide space for democratic processes to operate, both on
the federal and state levels. The wide berth originalism provides
free human activity, which is constitutive of human flourishing,
is central to its case for normative attractiveness.84

Although there is a great deal packed into this passage, there
is also a great deal missing. At most, this extract gestures at the
outlines of an argument linking originalism and the virtues, but it
is entirely conclusory, leaving unstated numerous essential
premises. For example, it can hardly be taken for granted that
originalism protects natural rights better than nonoriginalism, or,
even if it does, that protecting natural rights is the best way to
facilitate human flourishing.85 Similarly, it is not clear that “limits
on federal power through the constitutional principles of limited
and enumerated powers, separation of powers, check and
balances, and federalism” protect individual liberty better than
some purportedly alternative configuration of structural features
of federal governance consistent with nonoriginalism—or, again,
that protecting individual liberty in this specific way is the key to
human flourishing.86 It likewise begs the question to stipulate
that originalism supports the range of “free human activity”
necessary to facilitate human flourishing in a way that
nonoriginalism fails to do. Strang continues:
[Further], and most directly—and most controversially—the
original meaning is also substantively protective of human
flourishing because it protects activities necessary to human
flourishing and does not protect activities not conducive to
flourishing. For instance, the Constitution protects the freedom
of speech, but it does not protect abortion from government
restriction. To make a persuasive case for this claim would
require a detailed “cashing-out” of the Constitution’s original
meaning, which is beyond the scope of this Essay.87

84

Id. at 90–91 (footnotes omitted).
See Farrelly & Solum, supra note 29, at 2–3 (suggesting that promoting rights
is different from promoting virtue).
86
Strang, supra note 78, at 90–91; see also Farrelly & Solum, supra note 29, at 2–
3.
87
Strang, supra note 78, at 91 (footnotes omitted). Strang also offers a cluster of
propositions that purportedly provide “indirect[ ]” support for the link between
originalism and the virtues:
First, indirectly, numerous facets of the Constitution’s history, meaning, and
structure, suggest that the Constitution’s original meaning facilitates
human flourishing. As noted above, the process of Framing and Ratification
85
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Strang is correct in noting that his position is controversial,
but he must do more than elucidate the Constitution’s original
meaning to make his case. Once again, he must also explain why
the original meaning conduces to human flourishing. Why is it
that freedom of speech is essential to flourishing but reproductive
freedom is not? The answer turns on controversial moral
assertions not in evidence. Moreover, even if freedom of speech is
essential to human flourishing, that proposition cannot count in
favor of originalism if the alternative under consideration also
privileges freedom of speech.88
More generally, we are inherently limited in our ability to
assess the global “virtue outputs” of the substantive policy
outcomes generated by generic forms of originalism and
nonoriginalism. Such a task can only be undertaken partially and
hypothetically.89 In addition to a complete picture of an originalist
utilized the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ wisdom to construct a governmental
structure that would facilitate human flourishing. Also, the
supermajoritarian processes by which the Constitution was ratified utilized
the American People’s wisdom—and self-interest—to approve only those
governmental structures that would be conducive to their and their
descendants’ flourishing. Third, the Constitution’s writtenness itself both
facilitated the creation of a better constitution and preserves that
substantively good constitutional meaning.
Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted). I do not see how these propositions can provide even
indirect support for Strang’s view. Strang provides no basis for accepting that the
Framers sought to promote eudaimonia specifically, rather than some other end. Even
if Strang’s assertion were true, it does not follow that the Framers got it right. Indeed,
the mere fact that we now recognize many of the Framers’ views as deeply morally
problematic, see Barnett, supra note 13, at 613, strongly suggests that we should be
skeptical of their moral calculations. It is one thing to argue that certain important
objectives—stability in constitutional interpretation, for example, or limiting judicial
discretion—compel us to accept originalism notwithstanding the prejudices of the
Framers or the absence of viewpoint diversity in shaping the Constitution. It is quite
another to suggest both that the Framers sought to prioritize virtue-centered human
flourishing, and that we should accept their determinations about how to achieve such
flourishing even when we recognize their own substantial moral limitations.
88
Some of the staunchest defenders of freedom of speech, like the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), favor nonoriginalist judges. See Free Speech, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech [https://perma.cc/KWK3-RS2A] (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022) (explaining the ACLU’s prominent and century-long history of
defending free speech); ACLU Statement on Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to U.S.
Supreme Court, ACLU (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclustatement-nomination-neil-gorsuch-us-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/887S-W4V9]
(quoting the executive director of the ACLU criticizing the originalist approach of Neil
Gorsuch, who had just been nominated to a seat on the Supreme Court).
89
Citing some other scholarly work, Strang seems to think we can discern a great
deal about the different consequences of originalist and nonoriginalist approaches. See
Strang, supra note 78, at 87 (citing McGinnis and Rappaport for the conclusion that
“originalism provides for the best consequences”). But McGinnis and Rappaport do not
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world and its nonoriginalist alternative—something impossible to
acquire in principle—we would also need a precise understanding
of virtue-centered human flourishing. To achieve the latter, we
must stake out contested positions on the list of the virtues and
what those virtues entail.90
Strang ultimately falls far short of demonstrating a link
between the virtues and originalism, but, in doing so, he highlights
the need for a less contingent approach to understanding the
connection between constitutional interpretation and human
flourishing—namely, an approach less concerned with projecting
substantive outcomes.91 Still, to the extent we can link historical
policy outcomes with the virtues of the people, the results are not
encouraging for originalism, which is “commonly criticized for
being inherently hostile to the interests of minorities and
women.”92 The version of the exclusionary critique offered in Part
III elaborates on the relevance of this point in much greater detail,
suggesting at minimum that for a substantial subset of the
population—especially for groups that were excluded from the
Framing and remain disadvantaged—the conditions generated by
originalism are not particularly promising.
even address the virtues; they argue more generically and in the abstract that the “[i]f
the legislature or judges were to depart from [our C]onstitution extraconstitutionally,
that departure would not . . . lead to better results because the legislative and judicial
processes do not have the attributes to regularly produce better norms than those
contained in a pretty good constitution.” MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 80, at
20. Contra Strang, the connection between the functional features of originalism and
human flourishing are attenuated at best. Thus, although it is possible to compare the
functional characteristics of originalism—that it locks in a stable interpretation of the
Constitution indefinitely—with the contrasting functional characteristics of nonoriginalism—that it allows for the possibility of judges reading newer interpretations
or principles into the Constitution—that does not get us very far. What we need to
know, and what we simply cannot know, is which substantive values some unnamed
non-originalist judges might read into the Constitution, either now or in the distant
future. The long-term substantive implications of selecting originalism or nonoriginalism turn on that question, and without an answer the analysis is largely
hypothetical. It is an empirical question without the requisite empirical data to
resolve it.
90
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 213 (noting a disagreement between Plato and
Aristotle on the number and proper classification of the virtues). Strang gestures at
this when he suggests that reproductive freedom is not necessary for human
flourishing, indicating that he may find abortion morally problematic. See Strang,
supra note 78, at 91.
91
See infra Part III.
92
Fox, supra note 16, at 679; see also id. at 693–96 (responding skeptically to
McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument that “originalism would have been more
protective of black rights in the Jim Crow era had the Court followed Reconstructionera meanings”); infra Part III.A.3.
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Strang advances a more developed variation on his argument
in a subsequent book.93 More specifically, Strang offers a
normative justification for originalism that he calls a “law-ascoordination account.”94 Strang claims that this account “avoids
directly relying on the substantive outcomes of constitutional
interpretation to support its normative attractiveness,”95 which
distinguishes it from the version of his argument that I describe
above. The thrust of the revised argument is that the Constitution
helps Americans achieve human flourishing by coordinating our
coexistence in a manner necessary to achieve the common good.96
According to Strang, adopting a non-originalist understanding of
the Constitution would “undermine[ ] the Framers’ and Ratifiers’
prudential judgments, reject[ ] their authority, and destabilize[ ]
the social coordination established by the Constitution.”97
Additionally, Strang argues that originalism “respects the
Ratification process’ authority[,] . . . values the Framing process’
exercises of prudential judgment[,] and . . . explains why the
Constitution is imperfect.”98
This variation on the argument shifts the focus away from the
substantive outcomes promoted by any given method of
constitutional interpretation.
Presumably, however, the
substantive outcomes remain relevant, as Strang continues to
ground his case in some conception of virtue-centered
flourishing.99 As a result, if originalism happens to generate
outcomes that undermine the virtue-centered flourishing of the
public, then that outcome should still count against its selection
as a mode of constitutional interpretation. As I argue below, there
is at least one powerful way in which originalism does this that
scholars have overlooked.100
Moreover, the relationship between the theoretically
intermediate factors Strang has highlighted in this revised
argument and the flourishing of the public is unclear. For
instance, Strang suggests that permitting judges to draw on nonoriginalist factors may introduce a form of disharmony into our
93

See generally LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL LAW
ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019).
94
Id. at 227.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 284.
97
Id. at 290.
98
Id. at 293.
99
See id. at 309.
100
See infra Part III.

758

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:739

constitutional jurisprudence,101 but even if that were true—which
is far from obvious when the original document reflects a complex
political compromise rather than the work of a solitary author—it
is not obvious what implications that has for community
flourishing. Indeed, rejecting an original understanding of the
Constitution plausibly entails a qualified rejection of the authority
of the Framers, as Strang suggests. For reasons I offer in Part III,
however, that rejection will improve the ability of the Constitution
to promote flourishing among the public. There may even be an
internal tension among the criteria Strang identifies. For
example, to the extent originalist readings of the Constitution
alienate disadvantaged groups,102 adherence to the Framers’
prudential judgments might itself destabilize the mechanisms for
social coordination established by an original understanding of the
document. In short, although Strang’s second argument offers a
different pathway to the conclusion that originalism supports
virtue-centered
flourishing,
that
conclusion
remains
underdetermined—and possibly even undermined—by his
premises.
B.

Originalism as the Approach of Choice for Virtuous Judges

A second approach purports to justify originalism by
describing it as the mode of adjudication favored by virtuous
judges. Strang offers a version of this argument,103 as does
Lawrence Solum.104 These arguments extend a popular approach
of applying virtue analysis to the professional roles of legal

101

See STRANG, supra note 93, at 303.
See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 398.
103
See Strang, supra note 11, at 2033–39 (explaining this argument).
104
See Solum, supra note 75, at 520–21 (describing the approach of a virtuous
judge and prominently listing a commitment to “[o]riginal [m]eaning” as his fourth
principle).
102
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officers, especially lawyers105 and judges.106 Solum is a particularly
committed advocate of applying a virtue framing to the
professional responsibilities of judges.107 There is a compelling
logic to analyzing the duties of legal officers through the lens of
the virtues. One factor behind the return to virtue analysis in
moral philosophy is the perception that it has a special capacity to
capture the richness and complexity of moral deliberation.108 The
intricacies of moral deliberation find analogs in professional legal
practice, such as the demands of balancing one’s professional
responsibilities as an attorney, or the challenges inherent in ably
presiding as a judge over a complicated legal matter.109
105

See Rosalind Hursthouse, Two Ways of Doing the Right Thing, in VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE 247–48 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); Justice Jeff
Brown, ‘‘A Scout Is Trustworthy”: Applying Virtue Ethics to Lawyer Professionalism,
3 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 2, 11 (2013); Michael S. McGinniss,
Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Lawyer: Human Flourishing in a Legal
Community, 87 N.D. L. REV. 19, 30, 35–36 (2011); Robert Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous
Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU L. REV. 433, 435 (1997); see also Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at
Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 305, 305 (2000); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselorat-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 334 (1998); Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon’s A Nation
Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American
Societ’ and Anthony T. Kronman’s The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707, 708–09 (1996); Heidi Li Feldman, Beyond the
Model Rules: The Place of Examples in Legal Ethics, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 409,
409, 412 (1999); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good
Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 908–09 (1996); James W. Perkins,
Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 185, 187 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal
Profession’s Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and “The Manner That Is the
Man Himself,” 7 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (1993); Abbe Smith
& William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 511–
32 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 491–
92 (1999).
106
See Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 797–
98 (2003); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 182–83 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Virtue
Jurisprudence]; Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1365, 1368–69 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus
Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659, 675–77 (2005).
107
See supra note 106 (identifying several of Solum’s pieces on this subject).
108
See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 57, at 12–13 (describing the complexity of
properly applying practical wisdom to identify and balance the competing demands of
the various virtues).
109
At the same time, Solum has argued that “[j]udging seems to be the paradigm
case in which we want adherence to constraining rules and transparent decision
procedures[,]” which may render “virtue ethics . . . more awkward” than various
alternatives. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 106, at 185. It is partly for this
reason that Solum thinks a successful account of judicial virtue would be valuable; it
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Accepting for the sake of argument that the virtues are suited
for assessing the roles of legal officers, there is a gap between that
proposition and any attempt to attribute a preferred mode of
constitutional adjudication to a virtuous judge. Strang thinks that
practical wisdom, temperance, and fortitude will help judges
exercise their discretion judiciously, and that both practical and
theoretical wisdom—combined with a commitment to a virtue he
calls “justice-as-lawfulness”—will help judges “construct the best
legal doctrines” in circumstances where they lack discretion.110
Strang makes no secret of his view that originalism is the legal
doctrine a virtuous judge would select in the context of
constitutional adjudication,111 though in some ways he seems to
presume originalism is appropriate and fit the virtues around that
presumption.112
Solum itemizes a number of basic judicial virtues
(temperance, courage, good temper, intelligence and practical
wisdom)113 and judicial vices (corruption, cowardice, bad temper,
and certain intellectual limitations).114 Like Strang,115 Solum also
places heavy emphasis on the virtue of justice,116 and specifically
on the notion that justice incorporates lawfulness, which Solum
defines as “a special concern for fidelity to law and for the
coherence of law.”117 Solum believes a good judge will also be a just
judge, and that a conception of justice inclusive of lawfulness helps
ground a judicial commitment to incorporating original meaning
where necessary.118
Note that these arguments adopt a free-standing list of the
judicial virtues, which then happen, in their authors’ views, to
align at least to some extent with originalism. Of course, it is
plausible that good judges are courageous, wise, just, and so forth.

would show that “virtue ethics . . . will have succeeded where many would expect it to
fail.” Id.
110
Strang, supra note 11, at 2039.
111
Id. at 2038 (“[J]udges will also need the moral virtue of justice-as-lawfulness.
This ensures that the judges follow the original meaning.”).
112
See id. at 2033 (mapping out a section of his argument by identifying “facets of
originalist constitutional interpretation” and then “describ[ing] how virtue ethics
provides the tools originalism needs to make originalism the best it can be.”).
113
Solum, supra note 75, at 507–12.
114
Id. at 503–06.
115
See supra note 111.
116
See Solum, supra note 75, at 512–18 (exploring the importance and dimensions
of the virtue of justice in some detail).
117
Id. at 516.
118
Id. at 521.
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But judicial virtues are secondary virtues—properties of a good
legal officer in her official capacity—and Strang and Solum both
accept that the law should conduce to virtue-centered
flourishing.119 As a result, both commit themselves to a natural
objective around which judicial virtues should be defined. For a
theorist endorsing strong virtue jurisprudence, the virtues of a
judge as judge, or a lawyer as lawyer, should be those that help
the system promote the primary virtues of the public.120 Judicial
virtues are thus instrumental.121
Put another way, human virtues and judicial virtues are not
on the same plane. Human virtues are the highest ends individual
moral agents can attain, and a necessary condition for their
flourishing; by contrast, judicial virtues are role-virtues, a secondorder concept useful for molding a legal system into an effective
tool for promoting human flourishing throughout the system’s
jurisdiction, or even beyond.122 A judge who exhibits Solum’s list
of virtues will not necessarily be a flourishing human manifesting
eudaimonia. To flourish, she will need to be virtuous off the bench
as well, as a parent, sibling, neighbor, and so on. Perhaps being
good at one’s job—demonstrating the virtues through one’s
professional role, whatever that happens to be—is part of the story
for her own personal flourishing,123 but it is hardly sufficient. After
all, one can easily imagine an able and fair-minded judge who is
vicious in her personal life. At the same time, however, her role
as a judge is especially important—for a strong virtue
jurisprudence theorist—because she has the power to administer
and shape a system that ex hypothesi should conduce to the virtuecentered flourishing of its subjects.124 If she fails to do that,
whether by appeal to some independent list of qualities she seeks

119

See Sinha, supra note 29, at 215; supra text accompanying note 81.
See Strang, supra note 78, at 88; Solum, supra note 75, at 498.
121
Solum seems to deny this proposition. See Solum, supra note 75, at 501–02
(noting that many views, including originalism and welfarism, would see judicial or
constitutional virtues as instrumental to a particular end, and contrasting those
approaches with an “aretaic” or virtue-centered approach like his own, which “begins
with an account of the virtuous judge as primary and then proceeds to derive the
notion of a virtuous constitutional decision”). Perhaps a weak virtue theorist could
take this approach, but I am skeptical that Solum can square this stance with his
commitment to strong virtue jurisprudence.
122
See id. at 507.
123
See STRANG, supra note 93, at 300–01 (arguing that “judges . . . that follow the
Constitution’s original meaning preserve and build their characters . . . [because they]
exercise the virtues of justice-as-lawfulness, civic friendship, and faithfulness”).
124
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 215.
120
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to possess or otherwise, she undermines what the system is for.
The very concept of judicial virtues is parasitic on the purpose of
the legal system; we will have to define away as undesirable—in
this context, vicious—any approach to adjudication that
undermines the power of the system to achieve that purpose.125
In the next Part, I argue that originalism harms the power of
the legal system to conduce to the human flourishing of its
subjects. If that is correct, a proper list of the judicial virtues will
leave little room for originalist methodologies.
III. EXCLUSION-AS-INEQUALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INFLUENCE
The foregoing virtue-based arguments for originalism are
flawed. The idea that originalism provides the best set of
circumstances for virtue-centered human flourishing is badly
underdetermined both by the relevant theory and by the data
available, as is the proposition that virtuous judges would select
originalism. Both arguments, in their own way, assume what they
set out to show. But even if either argument were plausible, this
Part offers an independent and countervailing argument, which
begins from a reframing of the problem of constitutional exclusion.
Commentators have reasonably asked whether exclusion leads to
bad outcomes for disadvantaged groups; whether exclusion
undermines the legitimacy of the Constitution; whether exclusion
creates some general moral contamination for the Constitution;
and whether the Framing alienates subsequent generations of
excluded populations.126 These interpretations of the problem of
exclusion reinforce each other—indeed, they overlap in part—
because they all gesture indirectly at a common core: in virtue of
its origins, our Constitution elevates principles of moral and
125
For this reason, there is a genuine question whether any judicial character
trait that generally undermines the flourishing of the subjects of the legal system
could be regarded as a judicial virtue in a meaningful sense. Even if it were, it would
be counterbalanced by the need for the legal system to promote the primary virtues of
the public. Thus, for example, the judicial virtue of lawfulness endorsed by Strang and
Solum may require reinterpretation given the primary purpose of the legal system in
a virtue-centered society.
126
See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 382–83 (breaking up concerns about exclusion
into these categories). Mulligan also considers exclusion as a “[d]ead [h]and
[p]roblem[,]” id. at 394, which I address immediately below. See infra Part III.A. As I
argue in what follows, exclusion-as-inequality is not just a problem of moral
contamination pegged to the Framing, but rather a moral problem over which we
retain partial control today, and a problem with substantive—rather than purely
abstract—implications for the outcomes of constitutional adjudication.
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substantive inequality to the highest possible status in our
constellation of cultural and legal norms. And originalism only
exacerbates that problem.
A.

Constitutional Exclusion as a Three-Tiered Affront to
Equality

To see why constitutional exclusion is fundamentally about
inequality, we might begin with a misunderstanding of the
problem as a generic objection to dead-hand control. Michael
McConnell has argued that the exclusion of broad classes of people
from the drafting and ratification of the Constitution is irrelevant
because nobody alive today participated in those processes
either.127 This position misses the point of the objection in a
revealing way. It would not make sense to say that more recent
generations were “excluded” from the Framing; they were
uninvolved for the simple reason that they did not exist at the time
and therefore could not have been included. By contrast, Native
Americans, Black Americans, women, and white men of limited
means alive at the time were excluded in a meaningful sense.128
Whether as a matter of policy or simply because the circumstances
“organically” closed the door to participation from those of lower
social station, the Framing and ratification were largely restricted
to propertied, white men.129 Indeed, the Framers themselves
belonged to a group so elite that Thomas Jefferson famously
referred to them as “demi-gods.”130
This Part explores how these conditions, and the
constitutional text they generated, implicate the Constitution in
entrenching moral and substantive inequality; how originalism
exacerbates those implications; and why those implications
matter. More specifically, the Constitution’s propensity to serve
as a repository for our core national values ensures the importance
of updating it to include fundamental commitments our society
comes to accept as it makes moral progress. Perhaps most
interesting of all, the inspirational moral role of the Constitution

127

See supra note 18.
See Stein, supra note 16, at 398 (footnotes omitted) (“Only a small minority of
the adult population was able to participate in ratifying the Constitution or its
amendments. Among those excluded from the franchise were women, AfricanAmerican slaves, almost all Native Americans, and many poor white males, who were
excluded by property qualifications and poll taxes.”).
129
Id.
130
STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 16 (7th ed. 2020).
128
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aligns neatly with the presuppositions of strong virtue
jurisprudence. This result highlights our collective proclivity for
a virtue-centered view of the law’s purpose even as it forces
originalists into a difficult choice between their preferred method
of constitutional interpretation and their increasing acceptance of
the virtues as an organizing principle for the legal system.
Throughout this Part, I refer to equality—or inequality—in
two different senses. Moral equality is the widely-recognized
notion that each person possesses equal moral worth and warrants
equal respect in some meaningful sense, regardless of race, sex,
wealth, or various other characteristics.131 That is not to say
everyone ought always to be treated the same, but rather that they
ought to be treated with equal concern and respect.132 Another
way to state this idea is by claiming that all people possess equal
worth or dignity.133 The principle of moral equality lies outside the
realm of serious philosophical debate; it “is accepted as a minimal
standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and
moral culture.”134 For example, I assume without argument—and
without controversy, I hope—that permitting one race or class of
people to own another as property conflicts with the principle of
moral equality.
I also refer to substantive equality, a state of affairs in which
different groups are treated equally along important axes of life,
and therefore experience comparable life outcomes—especially in
relation to and under the law.135 It is more difficult to identify an
uncontroversial conception of substantive equality,136 which could
encompass equality of welfare, opportunity, material resources, or
other important criteria.137 But it is sufficient for the argument
advanced below that important opportunities and life outcomes
are empirically and demonstrably worse for some groups than for

131

For an introduction to the theoretical debates about the concept of equality,
see Stefan Gosepath, Equality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 27, 2007),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/ [https://perma.cc/88FE-FKTF].
132
Id.
133
Id. Under whichever formulation the reader prefers, moral inequality refers to
a principle that rejects the notion of moral equality—a view that accepts the superior
moral worth of some people over others.
134
Id.
135
Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 712,
712–13 (2016).
136
Gosepath, supra note 131 (noting that “we find competing philosophical
conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality”).
137
See id.
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others, primarily for groups that have historically been treated as
morally inferior as well.138
1.

The First Level of Constitutional Exclusion: History

As a problem of inequality, constitutional exclusion manifests
at three distinct levels.
First, as noted above, it is an
incontrovertible feature of history that the process of drafting and
ratifying the Constitution drew on a narrow demographic slice of
the American population,139 excluding many other groups at least
in part as a function of their lower social standing.140 In turn, at
least for some of these groups, lower social standing reflected
widespread acceptance of their morally inferior status in the eyes
of society at large or of the Framers in particular.141 This fact
138

See infra Section III.A.3.
For a particularly detailed account of the ratification process, see generally
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788
(2010). The Constitution ultimately came into effect upon approval by nine elected
state ratifying conventions. Id. at ix. In the most immediate sense, then, approval
turned on the perspectives of those who were elected to the relevant state ratifying
conventions. For more information on the state ratifying conventions, see generally
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions
as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457,
466–81 (2009). See also Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through
Which We the People Ratify Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of
the Constitution’s Ratification Clauses, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1440 (2005) (“[I]n
the debates over Article VII, the Constitution’s drafters, ratifiers, and
contemporaneous commentators unwaveringly manifested the understanding that
only specially elected conventions, and not ordinary legislatures, could serve as
representational structures through which the popular sovereign ratifies
constitutional norms.”).
Voting on representatives for the state ratifying conventions was more inclusive
than the drafting of the Constitution, but still quite exclusive. See Bruce Ackerman &
Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 563–66 (1995)
(noting that “property requirements did not disqualify a substantial percentage of
white male voters from casting a ballot[, and] indeed, a few states suspended all
property requirements for this special election” but that “participation rates were
unspectacular” and “of course, a vast majority of Americans—women and slaves—
were simply excluded from the process”). For more specific data on the demographics
of voters in the relevant states, who were primarily white males, see id. at 563 n.255.
See also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
Rev. 26, 35–36 (2000) (celebrating the “momentous, broad, and explicit popular
consent” behind the state ratifying conventions, which invited “[h]undreds of
thousands of ordinary folk . . . to vote,” but dismissively conceding that “[s]laves and
women are excluded from this moment” because “they had never been included
elsewhere”).
140
See Stein, supra note 16, at 398.
141
See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 383–84 (1997)
(footnotes omitted) (“Most of [the Framers] thought it acceptable to hold property in
human beings (and those who didn’t were prepared to compromise the issue). Virtually
139
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retains significance whether the views of the Framers were
common or even progressive for the era,142 and regardless of
whether the Framers sought specifically to exclude anybody from
the constitutional process. The moral inferiority operating in the
background also translated tangibly into substantive inequality
for excluded groups, which were by definition denied equal
influence over a matter of supreme political and legal importance:
the fundamental shape of our government.143
Additionally, the original constitutional text and the bare fact
of exclusion are intertwined.144 Some original text plainly reflected
acceptance of moral inequality,145 and we cannot know what the
all of them believed that married women should be treated, in essence, as the property
of their husbands. The Founders generally assumed that people without property
should not participate in politics, either because they lacked a sufficient stake in the
community to justify their participation in its governance or because their poverty
deprived them of the independence necessary for the exercise of responsible
citizenship.”); Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political
Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1851–53 (1992).
The framing of the American Constitution itself furnishes another chilling
example of how the supposedly communal pursuit of the common good can
lead to violent oppression. . . . Publius, writing in The Federalist, reasoned
that some groups of people, including African Americans, are so incapable of
perceiving the objective common good that they can be justifiably excluded
from the deliberations within the political community. Once these diverse
voices were politically silenced, Publius could observe that the (remaining)
American people were unusually homogeneous. The framers thus envisioned
a political community distinguished by consensus among members and
closure to all others, and the Constitution enforced this vision by sanctioning
the legal subjugation of racial minorities.
Id. (footnotes omitted); JERRY L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW:
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 28 (2d ed. 2019) (quoting a 1776 letter from
John Adams wondering whether “men in general, in every society, who are wholly
destitute of property, are . . . too dependent on other men to have a will of their own”).
One might describe Adams’s concerns as practical ones, consistent with the principle
of moral equality, though that is debatable and much less persuasive in the case of
the exclusion of women and certain racial minorities.
142
See Amar, supra note 139, at 35 (noting that probing constitutional exclusion
raises “[e]xcellent questions . . . from the vantage point of the twenty-first century[,]”
but that the matter looked different in “the eighteenth-century world giving birth to
the Preamble’s bold words”).
143
See id. at 34–36.
144
See Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 518–
19 (2011) (“It is not just that people of African descent were not represented at
Philadelphia or at the state ratifying conventions, but that the Constitution that
emerged from those conventions preserved and protected both slavery itself and
slavery’s institutional infrastructure.”).
145
One example is the notorious Three-Fifths Clause, which originally read as
follows:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
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original text would have said if it had been informed from the
outset by people deeply committed to a recognizable and consistent
principle of moral equality, let alone by a diverse set of such
people.146 Moreover, subsequent revisions are not redemptive in
any relevant sense because they leave this issue untouched.147
Thus, from the moment of the Framing, the Constitution both
incorporated substantive inequality and bore the stamp of moral
inequality.
At this first level, the problem of constitutional exclusion is
intractable, and it therefore counts to some degree against fidelity
to the Constitution.148 Perhaps deference to the Constitution
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The phrase “all
other persons” encompassed slaves, whose enslavement was preserved by the original
Constitution but who were given partial weight in population counts as part of an
agreement meant to boost the relative congressional and Electoral College influence
of southern states. See Greene, supra note 144, at 519; see also id. (summarizing two
other “direct accommodations for slavery” included in the original constitutional text:
the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the importation clause).
146
See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 75 (1991) (“Blacks were not consulted
by the ‘Founders’ nor were their concerns considered relevant by the drafters.
Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence and Madison wrote the preliminary
draft of the Constitution—Frederick Douglass did not.”). As I noted above, some
feminist scholars argue that the values expressed in the Constitution are inherently
masculine, and that the exclusion of women from the process of shaping our legal
institutions—both in the framing of the Constitution and in the centuries since—
results in a radically different legal structure from the one we might otherwise have
had. See supra note 14.
147
See Fox, supra note 16, at 696 (rejecting efforts by McGinnis and Rappaport to
address constitutional exclusion by pointing to later amendments). As Fox notes,
Time moves forward. Our notions of equality, justice, race, gender, and
democracy all change and develop over time based on our collective
experiences. The Constitution of 1868 was not simply the 1789 Constitution
without slavery, and the 1789 Constitution was not the Constitution of 1970,
but for slavery. Slavery and matters of race, gender, and social equality are
complex historical processes that cannot be addressed by such back-filling.
A restorative method cannot correct the original exclusions.
Id.
148
See supra text accompanying note 33; Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the
Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas at the Rubicon, 16 L. & INEQ. 429, 468–
69 (1998) (“It is worth pausing to note that this flaw in originalism, that it perpetuates
an original understanding that was the product of race-based exclusion, is also true,
to a lesser degree, of other forms of traditionalist interpretation.”); Thurgood
Marshall, The Bicentennial Speech, THURGOOD MARSHALL (May 6, 1987),
http://thurgoodmarshall.com/the-bicentennial-speech/ [https://perma.cc/T7YB-E2BN]
(“Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers
particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
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remains appropriate nevertheless because other values served by
adhering to it—stability or certainty, for example149—outweigh the
first-level concerns raised by constitutional exclusion.150 But even
justified adherence to the Constitution communicates our national
willingness to abide by the deep and offensive inequality, both
moral and substantive, reflected in the voices of those who
informed the foundational choices about how to structure our
government. In short, fidelity to our Constitution commits us to a
document that was historically exclusive. This is a substantial
cost even though—and in fact partially because—the text of an
alternative Constitution is unknowable. Unless we start from
scratch with a new document, we cannot erase the original
exclusions.
2.

The Second Level of Constitutional Exclusion: The
Symbolism of an Original Understanding

At the second level, there is a symbolic significance in our
choice of how to interpret a document created under exclusionary
circumstances.151 The more overtly we incorporate deference to an
original understanding of the Constitution, the more dismissive
we show ourselves to be about the harmful and inequitable
presumptions behind the original exclusions at the first level.152
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social
transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for
the individual freedoms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today.”); see
generally Klarman, supra note 141 (arguing against fidelity to the Constitution on
other grounds).
149
See Siegel, supra note 17, at 483 (noting that originalists often defend their
approach to constitutional interpretation by referencing similar aims).
150
No doubt there are also practical challenges to starting over, though it is
beyond the scope of this Article to explore the feasibility or net desirability of
attempting to overcome those hurdles.
151
The thriving debates between originalists and nonoriginalists provide ample
evidence for this.
152
See Stein, supra note 16, at 450 (arguing that “if the meaning of antebellum
provisions cannot evolve, the meaning of those provisions will remain fixed in the
political and legal culture of an exclusionary slave society.”).
Originalism is tied to the political and legal culture of the antebellum
Constitution. That culture is morally illegitimate, from a contemporary
perspective, in that it protected slavery and excluded most of the population
from politics. Even if we assume that a contested provision was not itself the
result of original exclusions, and even if we reject the public choice-type
argument that the original meaning of some provisions is likely to retard
moral progress, and even if originalism can claim some source of authority
that is not itself tainted by the original exclusions, still the unattractiveness
of fixing meaning in antebellum culture gives us some reason to reject
originalism.
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This concern is symbolic because it would stand regardless of the
actual, tangible outcomes in constitutional adjudication promoted
by an originalist approach. It is conceivable—though unlikely, as
I argue below—that an originalist approach could fare poorly in
addressing the problem at the second level but fare better than
alternatives at the level of producing equality in its substantive
application to constitutional questions.153 As a symbolic concern,
the second level of the problem of constitutional exclusion might
seem relatively unimportant. I argue, however, that it is of greater
significance than commentators have previously recognized.154
One partial response to this concern is that the Constitution
has undergone revisions over time that have struck out offending
text and replaced it with a more comprehensive understanding of
the moral equality of different groups of Americans.155 To the
extent that some of these amendments capture more modern
moral sentiments, originalism will reproduce those sentiments.156
The original understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1920 to extend constitutional voting rights to women,157
might be less symbolically offensive to prevailing notions of
equality than the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868 to, among other things, extend
citizenship to former slaves and “equal protection of the laws” to
all citizens.158 Both might be superior to original understandings
of text that no longer appears in the Constitution, such as the
Three-Fifths Clause.159
Originalism thus becomes less

Id.
153
For example, non-originalism need not in principle be devoted to updating the
Constitution in any particular way. One could adopt a non-originalist approach
devoted to producing even more morally and substantively inequitable outcomes than
original meaning would produce. Originalism would still score poorly at the symbolic
level, but it might outperform this specific variant of non-originalism in application.
154
See infra Part III.D.
155
See Greene, supra note 144, at 519–20 (acknowledging that, although “[t]he
process of constitutional design was unrepresentative along racial lines in
1787, . . . the Constitution that emerged from that process has been amended so as to
be more inclusive. . . . Correctly practiced, originalism fixes on the whole Constitution,
as amended”).
156
See id.
157
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
158
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Landmark Legislation: The Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ge
neric/14thAmendment.htm [https://perma.cc/3RRE-96RM] (last visited Jan. 9, 2022)
(offering this characterization of the Fourteenth Amendment).
159
See supra note 145.
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symbolically regressive over time as the text of the Constitution
comes to reflect our modern understanding of equality.
This observation is fine as far as it goes, but it is not
particularly helpful in mitigating the symbolic concerns arising
from the second level of the problem of constitutional exclusion.
After all, a great deal of the original text of the Constitution
remains, carrying with it significant regressive associations.160
And the original understanding of important later additions
preserves a great deal of inequitable sentiment as well. For
example, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not originally extend moral or substantive
equality to women.161
Some originalists recognize a version of this problem, and
therefore support efforts to “[s]eparat[e a]uthor from [t]ext.”162 For
example, Christina Mulligan suggests that, although it may be
160
See Culp, supra note 146, at 75 (arguing that “ ‘Defer to the past’ is the implicit
message[ of a]lmost all [forms of originalism.] Listen to the wiser and greater (and
whiter) founders.”); Marcosson, supra note 148, at 467 (footnote omitted) (“But even
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment, racism permeated the original understanding of
countless Constitutional provisions, including those directly accommodating slavery
and numerous others that did the same thing less directly.”); Stein, supra note 16, at
429–30 (noting that, although some “blithely assume that the abolition of slavery and
the expansion of the franchise excised from the Constitution all provisions with a
morally questionable original meaning, . . . the existence of some morally retrograde
provisions suggests that there are other morally retrograde provisions, and also
perhaps morally retrograde omissions”).
161
See Fox, supra note 16, at 699 (“The Fourteenth Amendment framers assumed
that women lacked the capacity to be full citizens and engage in public life.”); id. at
697 (arguing that “[g]ender exclusion presents originalism with perhaps its toughest
challenge [because h]alf the population (including half of the then-privileged race and
class) was excluded from constitutional ratification until the twentieth century.”); see
also Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional
Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1289–90 (2000).
Although the Fourteenth Amendment often was understood generally to
guarantee certain rights to all citizens, it also was understood not to threaten
the extensive regime of legal disabilities that the states imposed on women.
To whatever extent the Amendment protected political rights, for example,
it seems to have been understood to leave the states free to continue denying
such rights to women. The Amendment’s apparently categorical guarantees
of civil rights likewise left states free to deny such rights to married women,
just as they were free to deny them to children. This is not because women
(or children) were not regarded as citizens; everyone seems to have
understood that they were. Rather, these understandings often seem to have
been based on the idea that women enjoy these rights vicariously through
their families, and perhaps that legal regulation of women’s rights was
indeed a kind of regulation of the family peculiarly suited to the states rather
than the federal government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
162
Mulligan, supra note 7, at 431.
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important to inquire into the moral views of the Framers, such
matters do not bear a “close relationship to whether originalism is
a desirable method of constitutional interpretation.”163 Viewed
through the lens of virtue jurisprudence, this claim is likely
false.164 Moreover, it is impossible and inappropriate to separate
the authors from the text when the authors’ views about their
compatriots so heavily influenced the text—both in overt,
observable ways, and in unknowable ways through the exclusion
of their perspectives.165 This is especially true if we adopt an
originalist methodology, one that necessarily pushes us to
understand the authors—and similarly-situated, privileged
contemporaries—as a means of understanding the text. In all
relevant respects, and especially if we adopt originalism, we
operate under the Framers’ Constitution.166

163

Id. at 431–32.
See infra Part III.D.
165
See id.
166
Philosophers studying the concept of identity over time have long wrestled
with the link between the identity of an object and its extended, piecemeal revision.
One prominent thought experiment for testing intuitions about that link is known as
“the ship of Theseus”:
Over a long period all of the planks composing a certain ship are replaced
one by one. Eventually a ship indiscernible from the original, but composed
of entirely different planks, results. Call that later ship Replacement. As
each plank is removed from the original ship it is used to construct a ship
that is constituted from all and only the planks belonging to the original ship.
Call the ship composed of the same planks as the ones initially composing
the original ship Reassembly.
Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/ [https://perma.cc/W85G-8ZV7]. The
case may help us to refine our views about identity by forcing us to consider which
ship—the replacement or the reassembly—is the true ship of Theseus. But it also has
application in the case of the Constitution, which has been undergoing a slow and
partial process of replacement since its adoption. Most significantly, the interesting
philosophical questions raised by the ship of Theseus are nowhere on the horizon for
the Constitution, which retains the bulk of its original structure, and has been
modified primarily by subsequent additions that leave most of the original wording
intact.
See
generally
The
U.S.
Constitution,
NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/full-text
[https://perma.cc/RTR8-QS7U] (last visited Nov. 18, 2021) (showing the original text
of the Constitution and highlighting subsequent alterations and interpretations). It is
implausible to separate the Constitution from the Framers under these conditions,
even at the symbolic level. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding
Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2019) (“Our law today incorporates our
original law by reference. Officially, we treat the Constitution as a piece of enacted
law that was adopted a long time ago; whatever law it made back then remains the
law, subject to various de jure alterations or amendments made since.”).
164
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In short, at the second level, the problem of constitutional
exclusion relates to our choice of a mode of constitutional
interpretation, and what we communicate by that choice. Our
options allow us to place different degrees of separation between
our current moral commitments and the problematic
presumptions of the Framers or the drafters of early amendments.
Even if modern amendments to the Constitution help to blunt
originalism’s sharp edges, originalism still prioritizes an original
understanding—compared to non-originalist approaches more
inclined to minimize original understandings—and therefore
clearly conveys an acceptance of original prejudice. There may be
a spectrum of options before us at the second level,167 but
originalism lies on the wrong end of that spectrum; electing to
embrace originalism carries negative symbolic significance for
moral equality.
3.

The Third Level of Constitutional Exclusion: The Tangible
Outcomes of Constitutional Adjudication

At the third and final level, the problem of constitutional
exclusion concerns the extent to which our current understanding
of the Constitution tangibly erases, preserves, or compounds the
inequality expressed through the original exclusion of various
groups—despite amendments and pursuant to the ongoing
adjudication of constitutional questions.168 One underappreciated
reason for the persistence of concerns about constitutional
exclusion is that the groups excluded from shaping the
Constitution—and groups with similar features—continue to
manifest social disadvantage relative to the groups that were not
excluded.169 There may well be a complicated causal connection
between the original exclusions and the persistence of systemic
167

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
It is logically conceivable—if implausible—that a demographically
unrepresentative group of people could draft a document that properly balances the
views and interests of both excluded and included groups. Such an arrangement could
be historically exclusive and would, by definition, entail some substantive inequality
with respect to the framing, but the problem would extend less forcefully into the
future at the second—and especially at the third—level.
169
See Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 770–
71 (1991) (defining a systemic disadvantage as one “that operates along standard and
predictable lines, in multiple important spheres of life, and that applies in realms like
education, freedom from private and public violence, wealth, political representation,
and political influence, all of which go to basic participation as a citizen in a
democratic society[,]” and finding that race and sex are among the bases for such
disadvantage).
168
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disadvantage.170 At minimum, however, the fact that moral and
substantive inequality continue to overlap for the very same
populations ensures that an unbroken chain of inequality runs
from the Framing to the present day. Considering the length of
this arc, it is plausible to interpret the persistence of substantive
inequality as a marker of society’s continued acceptance of lower
moral status for the groups subject to original exclusion. At
minimum (and perhaps less controversially), at the substantive
level just as at the symbolic, constitutional amendments have not
eliminated the propensity of the document to be applied in a
fashion that reinforces either moral or substantive inequality.171
Additionally, different modes of constitutional interpretation
have the propensity to influence inequalities differently—whether
to whittle away at them or to reinforce them.172 Assessing any
particular mode of constitutional interpretation on this metric is
an imprecise exercise. As discussed above, one reason for this lack
of precision is that the Constitution has changed meaningfully
over time.173 Once again, the Constitution originally permitted the
practice of slavery,174 though the Thirteenth Amendment later
eliminated that particular feature.175 Similarly, the Constitution

170

I will not attempt to defend a strong, causal relationship between the fact of
constitutional exclusion and the fact that the groups excluded from the Framing
continue to face systemic disadvantage, though such a relationship may very well
exist. Even at best, however—even if those two facts are completely coincidental—the
latter is a constant reminder of the former, and a marker of a cultural and political
willingness to accept outcomes that happen to dovetail with the principle of inequality
enshrined at the time of the Framing. More likely, those results reflect our
foundational constitutional norms at work. Excluded groups were regarded as inferior
from the start, and Constitutional guarantees have not ensured substantive equality
across those groups centuries later.
171
See Fox, supra note 16, at 693 (“[S]lavery had a powerful, intricate, and
essential effect on the structure, language, and meaning of the Constitution and
nature of the federal government, an effect felt still to this day.”); see generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012) (documenting systemic disadvantages faced by
Blacks in the United States today); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 30–31 (1987) (noting indicia of systemic
disadvantage faced by women in the United States today); Erin A. Cech et al., Cultural
Processes of Ethnoracial Disadvantage Among Native American College Students, 98
SOC. FORCES 355, 356 (2019) (examining bias toward, and inequality experienced by,
Native Americans in the United States today).
172
See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
173
See supra notes 155–161 and accompanying text.
174
See supra note 144.
175
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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eventually came to reflect the principle that women, too, ought to
have the right to vote.176
Another reason it is difficult to assess many modes of
constitutional interpretation is that, changes in the Constitution
aside, there remains so much disagreement about the actual
meaning of many of the document’s provisions. For example,
debates persist to this day about whether various forms of
discrimination against certain groups of people are consistent with
the meaning of the amended Constitution.177
But originalism is largely associated with regressive outcomes
even today, which is highly suggestive that the original exclusions
continue to reinforce substantive inequality. Originalism resolves
constitutional questions by casting its eyes back toward a meaning
fixed at a time when—especially for the oldest provisions of the
Constitution—moral inequality was widely accepted. It therefore
carries a propensity, somewhat variable depending on the specific
strand of originalism in question,178 to incorporate inequality
substantively into the outcomes of constitutional adjudication.
For this very reason, many scholars routinely link originalism
with substantive inequality in result. For example, the Supreme
Court’s notorious “anticanonical”179 opinion in Dred Scott, holding
that “blacks were not ‘citizens’ within the meaning of Article III
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and therefore could not
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court,”180 is widely considered
an example of originalist analysis,181 even if a flawed one.182

176

See supra text accompanying note 157.
See supra note 161 (quoting scholars who argue that the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with limiting the rights of
women); Farnsworth, supra note 161, at 1294 (“If a theory of interpretation casts its
lot with a fixed set of understandings about what the clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment require, it is in ongoing and deepening danger as time passes of
generating answers to questions that are unacceptable by contemporary lights.”).
178
See infra notes 195–198 and accompanying text (discussing modern variants
made to soften the exclusionary impact of originalism).
179
See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 407, 411 (2011)
(arguing that Dred Scott is one of only a handful of cases in Supreme Court history
almost universally regarded as so wrongly decided that it is “anticanonical”).
180
B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court,
Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1833
(2013); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 421 (1857).
181
See Hill, supra note 180, at 1834.
182
Greene, supra note 179, at 407 (describing Dred Scott as “bad originalism”).
177
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Similarly, although some originalists have objected,183 numerous
critics hold that an originalist analysis could not have justified desegregating schools, as the Supreme Court did in Brown v. Board
of Education.184
To some extent, these sorts of outcomes are a feature of
originalism, not a bug. Originalists like Henry Monaghan have
accused certain nonoriginalists of pursuing substantive outcomes
through constitutional adjudication—including the articulation of
rights to privacy, autonomy, and equality—that the Constitution
does not support.185 According to Monaghan, “[i]f original intent
be our guide, the [C]onstitution did not authorize judges to
insulate from the political process most of the individual rights
asserted in current conceptions of political morality.”186 On
Monaghan’s view, the role of the Constitution is much more
limited than that; the document sets out a narrower agreement
altogether.187 As a historical matter, this view is not necessarily

183

See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995) (disputing the “consensus” that originalism would struggle
to justify the result reached by the Court in Brown).
184
See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also Greene, supra note 179, at 381 (footnote
omitted) (noting that “Brown . . . was in tension with the original expected application
of the Fourteenth Amendment, [and] was not compelled by the text of the Equal
Protection Clause”); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1996) (claiming similarly that originalism could
not have justified the outcome in Brown). Approval of the result in Brown now serves
as a test for the suitability of any given judicial nominee. Stein, supra note 16, at 421
(“While initially controversial, Brown is now almost universally accepted. . . . Rather
than questioning whether Brown was correctly decided, we take it as given that the
result is correct and measure the legitimacy of interpretive methods, such as
originalism, by whether they can support Brown.”).
185
See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 396
(1981) (arguing that, per “the original intent of the Framers of either the 1789-1791
text or 1868-1870 amendments[,] . . . the [C]onstitution has ‘very few ideas to
contribute’ to the social equality, privacy, and autonomy claims now pressed by
[nonoriginalist] commentators”); id. at 365 (“As a constitutional concept, equality
demands no more than the inclusion of groups into the political process.”). Monaghan
therefore criticizes the non-originalist view of some more progressive scholars
according to which, “properly construed, the [C]onstitution guarantees against the
political order most equality and autonomy values which [those] commentators think
a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought to guarantee to its
citizens.” Id. at 358 (emphasis omitted).
186
Id. at 396.
187
Scalia, supra note 5, at 861 (“It may well be, as Professor Henry Monaghan
persuasively argues, that [originalist philosophy] cannot legitimately be reconciled
with . . . the unrealistic view of the Constitution as a document intended to create a
perfect society for all ages to come, whereas in fact it was a political compromise that
did not pretend to create a perfect society even for its own age (as its toleration of
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implausible, but it has important ramifications: it naturally
rejects the more expansive government interventions necessary to
secure substantive equality for groups that have been situated at
a disadvantage throughout American history.188 Similarly, Justice
Antonin Scalia—a self-identified originalist189 and a major figure
in originalist debates more generally190—took the view that “[t]he
purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to prevent the
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the
society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
undesirable.”191
Plainly, the society that adopted the Constitution—or the
subset of that society positioned to adopt the Constitution—
rejected the notion that all their compatriots were moral equals,
and accepted widespread substantive inequality, including in the

slavery, which a majority of the founding generation recognized as an evil, well enough
demonstrates).”).
188
See McCarthy, supra note 8 (citing Aziz Huq for the view that “originalist
reasoning . . . harken[s] to a time when the conception of the federal government’s role
was much narrower . . . making it a particularly useful tool for dismantling public
health protections and other regulations”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our
Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) (arguing that even a
purportedly “color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby
maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other
Americans”). This feature may also have limited the power of the Constitution to
prevent moral inequality from leaking into adjudication not expressly concerned with
constitutional questions. See generally, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)
(resolving a land dispute without reference to constitutional provisions by relying on
racist characterizations of Native Americans).
189
Randy E. Barnett, Lecture, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 7 (2006) (analyzing Scalia’s self-described “fainthearted originalism”).
190
See George, supra note 29 (eulogizing Justice Scalia as an important
originalist).
191
Scalia, supra note 5, at 862 (emphasis omitted); see also Greene, supra note
144, at 521 (“As Justice Scalia has written, the purpose of constitutionalism from an
originalist perspective is to ‘obstruct modernity,’ and to prevent current majorities
from diluting or altering the values of the past.”); Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget
About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 CONST.
COMMENT. 431, 447 (2014) (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, in an interview,
“Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex. The
only issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t.”).
One of the most interesting problems with this point of view is that the “traditional
values” captured in the Constitution are specifically the values of the tiny subset of
the populace permitted to participate in the Framing and, perhaps, ratification.
Modernity may have brought a change in moral attitudes, but some of those changes
may simply result from our present willingness to take more seriously the views of
groups that were excluded originally. It is difficult to distinguish genuinely “new”
values from old values that simply went unheard and therefore unincorporated.
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Framing itself.192
We cannot therefore be surprised when
originalist analysis conduces to inequality; indeed, we should be
skeptical about the promise of elaborate efforts to demonstrate
results to the contrary.
A form of this objection increasingly penetrates originalist
scholarship. Beyond efforts to demonstrate that originalism
might, counterintuitively, generate the right result in cases like
Brown, some have recently attempted to bring greater diversity
into originalism. For example, Christina Mulligan suggests that
the demographic homogeneity of modern-day originalists may lead
to unconscious distortions in their interpretations about original
meaning.193 To counteract that possibility, she recommends that
scholars “seek consensus among other interpreters with different
backgrounds who are asking the same questions.”194
James Fox Jr. goes further. He argues that originalist efforts
to account for constitutional exclusion need to do more than
consider how excluded communities later came to understand
relevant constitutional terms; originalists should adopt
“Counterpublic Originalism,” which would examine sources that
documented how excluded groups interpreted the relevant
language at the time it was adopted.195 Such an approach would
therefore recognize the multiplicity of contemporaneous meanings
of ratified constitutional language or principles, acknowledging
“counterpublic” interpretations by groups with limited influence
over the text itself.196
These efforts reveal both an increasing understanding of the
seriousness of constitutional exclusion among originalists and the
limitations of originalism to confront the problem fully. Efforts to
bring diverse points of view into originalist analysis might soften
exclusionary inequality at the third level, but they could also
heighten the problem.197 After all, the perspective of excluded
groups on the meaning of constitutional provisions—whether
assessed presently or contemporaneously with the drafting of the
text in question—is not guaranteed to read equality into the
192

See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 398–99.
See id. at 404.
194
Id.
195
See Fox, supra note 16, at 719.
196
Id.
197
To the extent that the efforts at diversifying originalism are about severing its
association with inequality, those results are extremely unlikely to succeed, in part
because of the symbolic value of adhering to original meaning at the second level. See
Mulligan, supra note 7, at 434.
193
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meaning of the Constitution. Attending to these perspectives
merely provides a limited form of procedural equality in the
process of discerning original meaning.198 Sources channeling
“diverse” perspectives could well interpret the original meaning of
constitutional language to be even more inegalitarian than
“traditional” sources, in which case the diversification of
originalism would actually yield counterproductive results in
terms of promoting substantive equality.
In sum, we should expect an original understanding to have
regressive results for equality, whether through cases that
explicitly affirm moral inequality—like Dred Scott—or through
cases that extend long-standing substantive inequality for
excluded groups.199 And although nonoriginalist approaches could
in theory be used to inject even greater levels of moral inequality
into constitutional analysis, that possibility runs against the grain
of how nonoriginalist approaches have typically been applied.
Ultimately, wedding ourselves to original meaning inherently
limits our ability to deal with the problem of constitutional
exclusion at the third level, sharpens the problem at the second
level, and leaves it untouched at the first.200
B.

The Sui Generis Moral Role of the Constitution

I have argued that the problem of constitutional exclusion
boils down primarily to its implications for moral and substantive
inequality.
In addition to its superficial plausibility, that
explanation also unifies the various other characterizations of the
problem surveyed above. If the original exclusions connote moral
inequality and implicate substantive inequality, it is no wonder
they alienate excluded groups201 and create a sense of “moral
contamination.” Exclusion-as-inequality also has an intuitive
198
A contemporaneous, counterpublic interpretation of the Three-Fifths Clause,
for example, could not possibly eliminate the bald inequality it conveys, even if the
reasons immediately behind the compromise had more to do with a functional political
arrangement than a specific moral view of slaves. See supra note 145.
199
See generally Case, supra note 191 (making a version of this argument as to
women specifically).
200
Typical nonoriginalist approaches will also leave exclusion untouched at the
first level, though they will perform better at the second level by definition and may,
depending on how they are applied, outperform originalism at the third. See supra
text accompanying note 49 (describing “living constitutionalism”); see also Solum,
supra note 47, at 1246 (elaborating on living constitutionalism in greater detail).
201
In fact, viewed through the lens of the virtues, the propensity of the problem
of exclusion to alienate excluded groups is especially sharp and well-defined. See infra
Part III.D.
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relationship with democracy and legitimacy, although that
relationship is more difficult to parse. One must define the criteria
for legitimacy to argue that exclusion renders the Constitution
illegitimate; and many political outcomes reflect inequality, but it
is not necessarily clear that such outcomes are therefore
illegitimate.202 We also tolerate a great deal of inequality in our
political processes—for example, widely divergent political
influence of individual citizens based on their geographic
locations203— with contested implications for democracy.
Despite its intuitive power, the implications of understanding
exclusion as a problem of moral and substantive inequality are
dependent on further assumptions. In theory, originalists could
bite the bullet on exclusion-as-inequality. They could accept the
three levels at which the problem manifests, agree that their
approach heightens the problem at the second and third levels,
and acknowledge that disadvantaged groups express concern
about the problem, but still deny the relevance of any of those
concessions to the selection of a mode of constitutional
interpretation.204
But exclusion-as-inequality becomes much more powerful if
we make one further assumption: the law should function in part
202
That is not to say that arguments about legitimacy or democracy are bound to
fail, but they require additional premises that I will not supply or defend in this
Article.
203
See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, America’s Anti-Democratic Senate, in One Number, VOX
(Jan. 6, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/1/6/22215728/senate-antidemocratic-one-number-raphael-warnock-jon-ossoff-georgia-runoffs
[https://perma.cc/Q42X-W6RL] (noting that the 50-50 balance of Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S. Senate in 2021 belies the fact that over 40 million more people
voted for Democratic senators than Republican ones, reflecting in part the structural
features of the Senate that gives greater weight to “whiter and more conservative”
states); Lee Drutman, The Senate Has Always Favored Smaller States. It Just Didn’t
Help Republicans Until Now., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 29, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-senate-has-always-favored-smaller-states-itjust-didnt-help-republicans-until-now/ (tracing the recent history of the political shift
that has allowed a minority of the nation’s voters to determine the majority in the
Senate).
204
See Monaghan, supra note 185, at 396 (relaying Monaghan’s view that the
Constitution has little to say about social equality but nevertheless preferring
originalism). Monaghan does not explicitly confront a three-tiered conception of
exclusion-as-inequality, but his approach could serve as a model for originalist bulletbiting. To support such a stance, originalists might adopt criteria for legitimacy that
exclude concerns about inequality. See Barnett, supra note 13, at 652 (“Because the
binding nature of laws made pursuant to constitutional processes governed by the
original meaning of the Constitution is not based on popular sovereignty or consent,
it is not undercut, except indirectly, by the fact that women, slaves, children, resident
aliens, convicts, or all of us now living were excluded from the ratification process.”).
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to make us morally better.
That assumption may seem
controversial, but it lies at the heart of strong virtue
jurisprudence, and it is a common view among originalists.205 And
nowhere is that assumption more plausible than in the context of
the Constitution. As I argue below, a great deal of American legal
and political culture in fact embraces this premise at the level of
constitutional law.
There are several ways in which the law might influence us
morally, either generally or in the specific sense envisioned by
virtue jurisprudence. The most obvious method was well known
to early scholars working on the virtues: the law often prohibits
“immoral” conduct like malum in se offenses, backing such
prohibitions with legal penalties.206 Over time, the effect of those
prohibitions might be to condition people to act in the right way,
perhaps even for the right reasons.207 The law can also establish
the background conditions necessary for human flourishing, such
as by providing entitlements to the material needs that underpin
such flourishing.208 A third possibility, however, is that the law
might inspire the public by incorporating and modeling the most
fundamental moral values.
The Constitution is not well-suited to conditioning the public
into virtue by force of its prohibitions and penalties for the simple
reason that it primarily dictates limitations on government power
rather than regulating private conduct.209 It is not a criminal
code.210 But the substantive outcomes it produces likely bear on

205

See sources cited supra note 29 (listing a few examples).
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 219–24 (summarizing relevant views of Aristotle
and Aquinas). Aristotle accepted that “the coercive power of the law serves an
important function in conditioning the public to be virtuous,” and Aquinas saw
“obedience [to the law as] valuable because it ‘promotes the common good,’ helps to
‘avoid scandal or danger,’ and ‘provides a means to higher virtue.’ ”Id. at 220, 223.
207
Id. at 219–20. It is for this reason that some scholars believe virtue
jurisprudence justifies “morals” legislation, or the regulation of “private”
immoralities. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 29, at 1 (defending “morals legislation”
because it purportedly promotes the virtues of members of society); Cantu, supra note
26, at 1539 (arguing that modern interpretations of privacy rights and the decline of
“traditional families” have undermined the virtues of the American populace).
208
See Strang, supra note 78, at 88 (footnote omitted) (“Law is one of the key
mechanisms that humans utilize to achieve human flourishing. . . . [H]umans must
utilize law to set the background conditions—the common good—that make it possible
for humans to flourish. [For example,] private property is (generally) necessary for
human flourishing.”).
209
Travis Gunn, Knowledge Is Power: The Fundamental Right To Record Present
Observations in Public, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409, 1430 (2013).
210
See id.
206
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the material requirements for human flourishing,211 and, even
more obviously, the Constitution is the focus of a great deal of
public attention and national pride as perhaps the single most
prominent index of our political morality.212 The Constitution
enshrines and elevates the core values of our system, such as those
articulated in its Preamble, which include “establish[ing] Justice”
and “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty.”213 Originalists widely
accept that the Constitution expresses important values,214 noting
that one purpose behind adhering to an original understanding is
“to prevent current majorities from diluting or altering the values
of the past.”215
211
See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (describing Strang’s view, which
I challenge in this Article, that an original understanding of the Constitution would
set optimal conditions for human flourishing).
212
See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, 5 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 263, 267 (2015) (“A large part of why exceptionalist narratives of American civic
identity have had such a powerful grip on the national imagination is because of the
presumed symbolic meaning of the Federal Constitution. According to today’s scholars
and commentators, the Constitution gives concrete substance to the country’s civic
ideals, generating a political order grounded in democratic consent, pluralism, and
equal rights for all.”). Rana goes on to quote some prominent scholars celebrating
these purported virtues of our Constitution. Id.; see also Nikolas Bowie, Opinion: The
Challenges of Teaching the Constitution in the Age of Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 18,
2021, 5:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/18/challengesteaching-constitution-age-trump/ (arguing that “[t]he Constitution provides the
vocabulary by which this country debates what is just”).
213
The entirety of the Preamble reads as follows:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. Notably absent, of course, is a reference to moral or substantive
equality. Although the Declaration of Independence famously refers to the “selfevident” truth that “all men are created equal[,]” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), the legal structure subsequently imposed by the
Constitution functionally countermanded that proposition.
214
See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 431 (advocating for a focus on “the values
embedded in the text” of the Constitution rather than on the “flaws” of the Framers).
215
Greene, supra note 144, at 521 (citing Justice Scalia) (footnote omitted); see
also Scalia, supra note 5, at 862 (emphasis omitted) (“The purpose of constitutional
guarantees . . . is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in
original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
undesirable.”); Sean Hannity, Sean Hannity: State of the Union Shows Trump Is for
‘We the People,’ Democrats Are for Hating Trump, FOX NEWS (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/sean-hannity-state-of-the-union-shows-trump-isfor-we-the-people-democrats-are-for-hating-trump
[https://perma.cc/4ZAN-2QH6]
(describing President Trump’s first two Supreme Court appointees as
“originalists . . . who will uphold our constitutional values”). Commentators across the
political spectrum accept that we operate under, and may even be duty-bound to
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The importance of the Constitution in political culture
therefore extends beyond its status as legally primary; it has come
to represent a vehicle for our national values, and we honor it as
such.
Although commentators disagree about the values
expressed in the Constitution, prevailing legal and political
culture invests it with widely-acknowledged normative and
inspirational power. Numerous civic societies celebrate competing
visions of the Constitution.216 A national holiday commemorates
its original signing.217 By statute, most federal officials and
members of the military must take an oath to “defend the
Constitution . . . against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”218
Legal advocacy groups frame their activities in similar terms
because they (and their donors) see the defense of the Constitution
or constitutional rights as a laudable goal.219 Advocates and
defend, our “constitutional values.” See, e.g., Howard Simon, We Must Fight
Disinformation To Save Our Democracy, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2021/01/13/we-must-fight-disinformation-tosave-our-democracy-column/ [https://perma.cc/5MU2-3D23] (featuring an argument
by a former ACLU lawyer arguing that “the protection of our constitutional values
and the rule of law is our collective responsibility”).
216
See About the National Constitution Center, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/about [https://perma.cc/8NRT-V8V7] (last visited Feb.
9, 2022) (providing information about The National Constitution Center, which
“brings together people of all ages and perspectives, across America and around
the world, to learn about, debate, and celebrate the greatest vision of human
freedom in history, the U.S. Constitution”); About ACS, A M . C ONST . S OC ’ Y ,
https://www.acslaw.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/T8GL-NATR] (last visited
Feb. 9, 2022) (providing information about the American Constitution Society,
which “realizes the promises of the U.S. Constitution by building and leading a
diverse legal community that dedicates itself to advancing and defending democracy,
justice, equality, and liberty; to securing a government that serves the public interest;
and to guarding against the abuse of law and the concentration of power”); About Us,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/MB5M-JSC2] (last
visited Feb. 9, 2022) (providing information about The Federalist Society for Law and
Public Policy Studies, which is more commonly known as The Federalist Society, and
noting that the group “is founded on the principles that the state exists to preserve
freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution,
and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law
is, not what it should be. The Society seeks both to promote an awareness of these
principles and to further their application through its activities.”).
217
Celebrating Constitution Day, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov
/news/topics/constitution-day [https://perma.cc/X934-LZJ5] (last updated Sept. 13,
2021).
218
5 U.S.C. § 3331.
219
See, e.g., Some Highlights Why We Do What We Do How We Do It, ACLU
https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history [https://perma.cc/2QB4-GP8T] (last visited
Feb. 9, 2022) (describing how the ACLU, “has evolved in the years since from this
small group of idealists into the nation’s premier defender of the rights enshrined in
the U.S. Constitution”).
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politicians call on members of the public to defend the Constitution
or its values as well,220 including when doing so might involve
breaking the law.221 The government even spreads aspirational
messages about the Constitution to audiences outside the United
States.222 Indeed, the notion of the average American enamored
with constitutional values is so well recognized that it has become
the subject of prominent political satire.223
That political leaders and members of the public disagree on
the values expressed in the Constitution is no objection; if
anything, that fact underscores the legal, political, and rhetorical
potency of describing one’s views as aligned with a proper reading
of the Constitution. Even if we accept that the original purpose of
the Constitution was a limited one—say, to establish relatively
narrow channels of federal power, leaving a great deal of
substantive discretion to the individual states224—conservative
220
See Ryan Wolf, MAGA Patriot Party Organizer Calls It ‘Personal Calling’ To
Defend Constitution, KTXS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://ktxs.com/news/local/maga-patriotparty-organizer-calls-it-personal-calling-to-defend-constitution
[https://perma.cc/U97P-Z7M8].
221
See Catie Edmondson & Luke Broadwater, ‘Be Ready To Defend the
Constitution’: How Some Republican Lawmakers Fanned the Flames Before Riot That
Shook the US Capitol, BALT. SUN (Jan. 12, 2021, 10:04 AM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/ct-nw-nyt-capitol-riot-republicans20210112-td6dq5bvgvgkvbwhlnm66do6iy-story.html
(citing
Republican
Congressman Paul Gosar’s op-ed, calling for supporters of President Trump to “[b]e
ready to defend the Constitution” against “illegitimate usurper” and winner of the
2020 presidential election, Joe Biden).
222
See, e.g., Statement by Michael Pompeo on the International Human Rights
Day, U.S. EMBASSYM URU. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://uy.usembassy.gov/statement-bymichael-pompeo-on-the-international-human-rights-day/
[https://perma.cc/Z4UXU9HF] (featuring a statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that was posted by
the U.S. Embassy in Uruguay, in which Pompeo noted that “[t]he Declaration of
Independence, U.S. Constitution, and Bill of Rights have guided our nation for more
than 200 years in promoting rights and freedoms”). By the Department of State’s own
description, the Secretary of State is “the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser” in
support of the President’s role “determin[ing] U.S. foreign policy.” Duties of the
Secretary of State, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/duties-of-thesecretary-of-state/ [https://perma.cc/FXL2-HYNR] (last visited Feb. 9, 2022). The
Secretary thus often addresses comments to foreign governments or populations. See
id.
223
See Area Man Passionate Defender of What He Imagines Constitution To Be,
ONION (Nov. 14, 2009, 8:02 AM), https://www.theonion.com/area-man-passionatedefender-of-what-he-imagines-consti-1819571149/
[https://perma.cc/J39E-HWNV]
(mocking a fictional—albeit realistic—American man who, moved by the perception
that the current political administration is violating the Constitution, believes “[i]t’s
time for true Americans to stand up and protect the values that make us who we are.”).
224
See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Law
Origins of American Federalism, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 843 (2020) (arguing that
“[t]he American States could have compromised their sovereign rights—including
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figures bear as much responsibility as anyone for the veneration
of the Constitution and, accordingly, the deification of the
Framers’ values.225
As a result of the Constitution’s lofty status, there is
substantial normative significance to the conclusion that any
specific values are enshrined there. Such values become deeply
American, worthy of reverence and protection.226 Their elevation
shapes both the legal and the moral orientation of the public.227 By
the same token, values excluded from the Constitution lose
perhaps the single greatest basis for gaining widespread
sovereign immunity, immunity from commandeering, and equal sovereignty—only by
adopting constitutional provisions that clearly and expressly altered or surrendered
them. Thus, unless the Constitution expressly overrides the States’ preexisting
sovereign rights, the ‘States’ necessarily retained such rights.”); Richard A. Epstein,
Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 188
(1996) (“The basic design of the Constitution sought to achieve some balance between
the powers ceded and the powers retained by the states, such that those necessary for
union were transferred while all those needed for local governance were retained.”).
225
Conservative commentators frequently celebrate the various virtues of the
Framers and the inspiration they provide. See, e.g., What People Are Saying, in About
Us, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/about-us#FAQ [https://perma.cc/W5UCNP2G] (last visited Feb. 9, 2022) (quoting conservative law professor Jonathan Turley
describing himself as “an unabashed Madisonian[,]” who believes James Madison
“helped shape a constitutional system which is unique and has proven itself time and
time again to be inspired.”); id. (quoting President Ronald Reagan’s praise for the
Federalist Society for its role in “returning the values and concepts of law as our
founders understood them to scholarly dialogue, and through that dialogue, to our
legal institutions.”); Jay Nordlinger (@jaynordlinger), TWITTER (Jan. 19, 2021, 8:50
AM),
https://twitter.com/jaynordlinger/status/1351527460878352385
[https://twitter.com/jaynordlinger/status/1351527460878352385] (expressing the view
of a senior editor for the conservative National Review describing the Framers as
“geniuses”); Ben Shapiro (@benshapiro), TWITTER (July 4, 2017, 9:13 AM),
https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/882225794210160640 [https://perma.cc/QBN8NYB6] (referring to the Founders as “the greatest single assemblage of thinkers in
world history”); Turning Point USA, The Founding Fathers Were Selfless Leaders,
(June
25,
2020),
FACEBOOK
https://www.facebook.com/turningpointusa/videos/3563631873652326
[https://perma.cc/74NU-KW5C] (featuring conservative pundit Charlie Kirk praising
the Founding Fathers as “selfless”); Stephen Davis, John Adams Was a Genius,
TURNING POINT USA (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.tpusa.com/live/john-adams-was-agenius [https://perma.cc/U6QL-SH53] (discussing John Adams’s emphasis on morality
and religion as foundational values behind the Constitution); see also Greene, supra
note 5, at 84 (“The rhetoric upon which originalist arguments rely, often successfully,
is driven by a narrative about the American ethos.”).
226
Greene, supra note 19, at 713 (footnote omitted) (“Values imputed to ‘the
Framers’ or ‘the Founders’ are not only distinctly American but have acquired a
presumption of rightness within our political culture. An interpretive modality that
avails itself of their views and associates its own rightness with theirs gains an
immediate rhetorical advantage.”).
227
Id.
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acceptance among the public. In some essential sense, they are not
traditional, and they therefore demand additional justification.228
Crucially, it is the Framers’ values that most obviously fit the
constitutional story, especially for the originalist.229 Based on the
foregoing, the Framers’ values do not plausibly include moral and
substantive equality, and the persistence of substantive inequality
under the Constitution is at least suggestive of its ongoing
tolerance for, or consistency with, moral inequality.
Put another way, the Constitution’s role in public life
dovetails with the expectations of strong virtue jurisprudence.230
But it does so in a distinctive way. Legal and political practice
have conferred on the Constitution a sui generis power to influence
the moral development of the populace by its power to define
national identity and its apparent potential for moral
inspiration.231 Constitutional values are arguably the most
important source of moral influence in American law, and our
public embrace of that proposition has simultaneously invested
originalist approaches with additional significance and primed us
to accept strong virtue jurisprudence.
C.

Equality and the Virtues

The special role of the Constitution helps to explain the power
of exclusion-as-inequality,232 but we need one more premise to link
all this to virtue jurisprudence. Specifically, we must accept that
moral equality is central to manifesting the virtues. And, just as
one might doubt the relationship between the protection of rights
and the attainment of the virtues,233 one might also doubt the
relationship between moral equality and the virtues. For example,
Solum has argued that promoting virtue-centered human
flourishing through the law is a fundamentally different exercise
from promoting equality, rights, or welfare.234 There is something
to his claim; perhaps a system devoted primarily to promoting the
228

See Fox, supra note 16, at 682–83.
See Greene, supra note 19, at 713; supra Part III.A.
230
See supra Part I.B.
231
It is perfectly coherent to maintain that the Constitution should not play this
role, or more generally to reject a core premise of strong virtue jurisprudence. It is
unclear how many people do—or would be able to—hold this line in a principled
fashion, however. Moreover, so long as the Constitution does, in fact, function in this
way, the values it reflects will take on outsized importance.
232
See supra Part III.B.
233
See FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra note 29, at 2–3.
234
Id.
229
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virtues would come apart, at least at the margins, from a system
devoted primarily to equality, rights, or welfare.
But that is not to say that there is no relationship between the
virtues and any of these concepts. A destitute population may
struggle to flourish because happiness is elusive when one’s
fundamental needs go unmet, and because competition for daily
necessities displaces the human capacity for manifesting various
virtues, like benevolence and generosity. The same is true of
equality, a conclusion we reach without making any particularly
controversial assumptions. As I noted above, moral equality is a
basic premise few would dispute.235 Presuming the equal moral
worth of our compatriots neutralizes the bases not only for racism,
but also for sexism, homophobia, and various other prejudices
pegged to ascribed or otherwise morally irrelevant
characteristics.236 Moral equality similarly precludes views built
around the notion that certain groups—often advantaged ones—
are intrinsically entitled to greater power or influence.237 As noted
above, even the Framers recognized the power of the concept of
moral equality;238 they simply did not believe it extended to all of
their compatriots.239
It requires only a small leap to conclude that a virtuous person
will enact the virtues—whatever they happen to be240—in
accordance with an understanding of the moral equality of

235
See supra text accompanying notes 133–134. Even the Trump administration
attempted to claim equality as an original American value. See THE PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, THE 1776 REPORT 4 (2021) (“The core assertion of the
Declaration [of Independence], and the basis of the founders’ political thought, is that
‘all men are created equal.’ From the principle of equality, the requirement for consent
naturally follows: if all men are equal, then none may by right rule another without
his consent.”).
236
Naturally, the outer reaches of this basic principle may be contested.
Reasonable disagreements might arise about which characteristics are morally
irrelevant in this context. But that is no objection to the argument advanced here.
237
See THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, supra note 235, at 5; see also
Laura Smith, Lone Wolves Connected Online: A History of Modern White Supremacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/louis-beamwhite-supremacy-internet.html (offering a recent history of white supremacy in the
United States).
238
See THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, supra note 235, at 4 (favorably
citing the principle of moral equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence).
239
See supra note 141.
240
Above I have noted that virtue theorists disagree about the full list of virtues,
supra note 62 and accompanying text, and I have not taken a position on the
comprehensive list here. My claim here is that any compelling list of the virtues will
require that their manifestation align with the acceptance of moral equality.
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persons.241 An otherwise kind, honest, intelligent racist or
misogynist cannot manifest human excellence—especially, but not
exclusively, if we accept that to possess any of the virtues is to
possess them all.242 Similarly, members of a disadvantaged
population who internalize their diminished moral worth relative
to that of their neighbors will struggle to demonstrate adequate
pride or self-respect in the face of a legal system that has long
created or countenanced their disadvantage.243 There is no
plausible conception of the virtues that exempts us from accepting
the moral equality of persons as a baseline; a presumption of moral
equality is the compass that orients our virtuous attitudes both
toward others and toward ourselves.
Note that, from the standpoint of influencing the virtues of the
modern-day populace, it is irrelevant whether the Framers were
ahead of their time, morally speaking. We do not hold that
excluded groups were, in fact, morally inferior at the time of the
Framing; we hold that the Framers were simply mistaken about
the relative status of their excluded compatriots.244 Some might
accept that the Framers’ moral mistakes were more forgivable
then than they would be now, given prevailing social norms.245
Even if that is true, it is entirely different from accepting that the
Framers were right; we are well aware that they were not.
D. The Originalist’s Dilemma
Considered collectively, the foregoing arguments create both
a challenge to constitutional fidelity and an especially serious
dilemma for originalists. Constitutional exclusion is a complex,

241
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 211, 235 (defending a corollary—namely, that a
virtuous person has license to demand equal treatment under the law as a matter of
self-respect, including by taking a negative view of the law when it persistently treats
her worse than her compatriots).
242
See supra text accompanying note 64.
243
See Sinha, supra note 29, at 235 (arguing that self-respect must appear on any
list of the virtues, either as its own virtue or as part of another virtue like humility or
pride). For a philosophical account of humility that supports this analysis, see G. Alex
Sinha, Modernizing the Virtue of Humility, 90 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 259 (2012). A
meaningful commitment to self-respect would arise from the application of the
principle of moral equality to oneself.
244
Or we pretend that the Framers accepted moral equality for all. See THE
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, supra note 235, at 4 (describing the principle of
equality articulated in the Declaration of Independence as the “basis of the founders’
political thought”).
245
See supra note 139 (quoting Amar’s view that the ratification process was
remarkably inclusive considering the social context at the time).
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multi-layered problem that implicates moral and substantive
inequality. As a problem of inequality, it is especially difficult to
address at the first level, where we must choose either (1) to
operate under a constitutional structure established—and
influenced in ways both knowable and unknowable—through the
exclusion of certain groups perceived at the time as morally
inferior, or (2) to adopt a new constitution under less exclusionary
conditions. Many may be willing to disregard this challenge to
constitutional fidelity, if nothing else because of the practical
difficulties of adopting a new document.246
But even if we reject this challenge and accept our
Constitution, as amended, we retain greater control over the
problem of constitutional exclusion at the second and third levels.
More specifically, we can weigh the symbolic and substantive
implications for moral and substantive equality in adopting any
given method for interpreting the Constitution. As I have argued
above, originalism does poorly on these levels by design; it seeks
to preserve the original understanding of the Constitution in part
to preclude the revision of original constitutional values, and in
part because it takes a narrower view of the substantive values
the Constitution can bear.247 Whatever its other merits, as an
approach, originalism is symbolically and substantively unsuited
to addressing exclusion-as-inequality.248
None of this would matter much if exclusion-as-inequality
were only a minor problem. But it extends beyond sentiments,
which are more important than some may realize,249 and it is not

246

For a fascinating description of the Black Panther Party’s 1970 convention, at
which participants drafted new constitutional text, see Rana, supra note 212, at 284–
86.
247
See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
248
As I noted above, some originalists may be willing simply to accept this. See
supra text accompanying note 204.
249
See Greene, supra note 144, at 522.
Constitutional methodology translates, between word and deed, hope and
reality, authority and violence. To choose a methodology is to choose the
connective tissue between Constitution and subject. It is to adopt a narrative
that enables a people not merely to submit to the state but to experience the
Constitution as theirs. For that choice to be right, it needs to feel right; it
must resonate with how one in fact experiences one’s relationship with the
nation and its commitments. A racially-sensitive constitutionalism must
always, therefore, hold out the possibility of legitimate dissent from history.
Originalism denies that possibility, and so for me, as I suspect for many
African-Americans, it speaks in a foreign tongue.
Id. These sentiments find a firm basis in the thread of inequality that runs through
the Constitution from the Framing to the present.

2021]

ORIGINAL(ISM) SIN

789

merely a regrettable fact with amorphous implications that we can
acknowledge while pushing past.250 It is a fundamental concern
about the relationship between the law and the moral orientation
of its subjects. For better or worse, the Constitution’s prominent
place at the heart of our political morality endows it with massive
moral influence.251 We therefore have weighty reasons to ensure
that, to the extent possible, it reflects our most fundamental moral
commitments—even if those commitments diverge from the
original ones reflected in the document as drafted. In other words,
powerful considerations compel us to incorporate moral equality
into the Constitution where we can.
Moreover, if the law can condition virtue, it can also condition
vice.252 The question, then, is not merely whether the Constitution
overtly incorporates key moral principles or simply remains silent
about them. Otherwise, one might be tempted to fend off the
challenge posed by the original exclusions by asserting that
substantive equality is missing from the Constitution because the
document memorializes a relatively narrow agreement about a
limited federal power structure and little else.253 Instead, we must
be attuned to the most morally poisonous result, which would be
for the Constitution to affirmatively model vicious principles.
Exclusion-as-inequality alleges exactly this: adhering to original
meaning ensures that the Constitution positively represents
moral inequality, even if—or especially because—the Constitution
was not originally conceived to promote substantive equality.254
Because we can easily choose to reject adherence to original
meaning, at least some of the time,255 to embrace original meaning
250
See generally Mulligan, supra note 7 (acknowledging the problem of
constitutional exclusion but defending the view that a modified version of originalism
is responsive).
251
See supra Part III.B. The exalted status of the Constitution helps explain why
members of systemically disadvantaged groups experience such a sharp sense of
alienation from the Constitution. See supra note 249.
252
See Rana, supra note 212, at 268 (suggesting that the “country’s identitarian
shift from settler to civic nation has meant that Americans have never properly
confronted the country’s colonial infrastructure or the living legacy of its settler
history.”).
253
See supra note 187.
254
See Dworkin, supra note 184, at 13.
255
See id. at 7–12 (describing Dworkin’s favored “moral reading” of the
Constitution, which endorses “stating the constitutional principles at the most general
possible level,” including in understanding the notion of equality, but also recognizing
that the moral reading is not always appropriate because the “Constitution includes
a great many clauses that are neither particularly abstract nor drafted in the
language of moral principle”). For those concerned that the argument presented here
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in those instances betrays a vicious, modern-day willingness to
permit a document as important as the Constitution to continue
modeling moral inequality.
This dilemma leaves originalists in a difficult position. Unless
they soften their approach to embracing an original understanding
of the Constitution, their best bet is to deny the importance of the
law’s moral influence.256 Taking this path would allow originalists
to whistle past the graveyard of constitutional exclusion, but at a
cost: it entails both the repudiation of the role the Constitution has
assumed in our political and legal practice and the rejection of
strong virtue jurisprudence.257 This result would be expensive for
the originalist. Many originalists have celebrated traditional
constitutional values,258 and a number more have expressed an
affinity for strong virtue jurisprudence.259 Indeed, widespread
moralistic celebration of constitutional values is a compelling piece
of evidence that strong virtue jurisprudence has a wide base of
support among the public and may be on the right theoretical
track. Ideally, exclusion-as-inequality will channel scholars and
judges onto the right track as well.

might broadly undermine the ability of lawmakers to set down guidance for the future,
Dworkin’s view highlights one possible limiting principle. Even leaving Dworkin’s
view aside, however, another limitation presents itself: the argument presented above
gains its strength from the chasm between the contemporary recognition of the
importance of moral equality (on one hand) and the disregard for that principle we
show in adopting an originalist mode of interpretation for our most important legal
text (on the other hand). Other legal dictates that are deemed morally deficient in the
future may be vulnerable to a parallel challenge, but the strength of that challenge
may be diminished by the nature of the perceived moral deficiency and the lower
importance of the legal instrument in question.
256
Strictly speaking, originalists have a few other options, but those options are
nonstarters. Originalists could deny that constitutional exclusion implicates moral
inequality, but that seems obviously implausible. They could also reject a commitment
to moral equality, but that would be extraordinary. They could deny that the
Constitution should play a moral role, but that ship has sailed, in part because of
originalist celebrations of the values embedded in the Constitution. See supra note
225. Originalists could also dispute the influence of a constitutional embrace of moral
inequality on the vices of the populace, although that connection seems far stronger
than any countervailing connections originalists have identified between originalism
and public virtue. See supra Part II.
257
See supra Part III.B; see also supra Part I.A (defining strong virtue
jurisprudence).
258
See supra note 225.
259
See supra note 29.
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CONCLUSION
This Article does not address the complete universe of
putative merits and demerits of originalism. It does not suggest
that concerns about constitutional exclusion form the only
relevant basis for selecting a method of constitutional
interpretation. Although it observes that certain non-originalist
approaches could be better equipped to manage exclusion-asinequality,260 the Article also declines to endorse any specific
approach to constitutional interpretation. Instead, the Article
reframes the problem of constitutional exclusion and highlights its
relevance. Exclusion-as-inequality poses a serious challenge to
our constitutional order, but it presents an especially sharp
challenge for originalists. Scholars and judges can still accept
originalism if they are willing to pay the price exacted by
exclusion-as-inequality, but they should recognize that the price is
steep.

260
The development of a consensus around a preferred model of nonoriginalism
may ultimately prove essential. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 855 (offering an
admonition that “[y]ou can’t beat somebody with nobody”). But the implications of
exclusion-as-inequality may help to light the way forward.

